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SUMMARY 
Based in principle on a case study of Hungary, this paper raises im-
portant questions about the ability of Central and East European states 
to achieve their competitiveness goals within the framework of EU 
membership. While more conventional views tend to suggest that the 
EU policy framework represents a “best strategy” scenario for these 
countries, this paper fundamentally questions this view. Based on an 
analysis of both the competitiveness strategies pursued by Hungary 
prior to EU membership, this paper suggests that Hungary was forced 
to abandon many of the more successful tools employed prior to and 
during the accession process. 
Whether the EU policy framework is likely to represent a positive 
trade off depends in many ways on the degree of real flexibility within 
the EU policy framework and the willingness of the Old Member States 
to continue funding the goals of economic and social cohesion. 
Through an analysis of the EU structural and cohesion funds, the cur-
rent drive for tax harmonization and finally competition and state aid 
policies in the EU, this paper suggests that ongoing debates within the 
EU emphasize the competitiveness concerns of the more economically 
advanced states and illustrate only moderate dedication to the goals of 
economic and social cohesion. 
As a result, this paper raises important questions about the de-
gree to which EU membership genuinely represents an optimal strategy 
choice for the New Member States. In some ways, EU membership 
provides an opportunity for the more advanced Old Member States to 
control the policy strategies employed by the New Member States. In 
this regard, EU membership imposes important constraints on the abil-
ity of the New Member States to pursue independent policy agendas. 
Just as importantly this paper suggests that a new North/South (or 
now East/West) divide may be opening in the European Union across 
which the competitiveness interests of different states are likely to fuel 
policy debate for some time to come. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
The New Europe provides a fascinating 
testing ground for assumptions about the 
relative efficacy and feasibility of supra-
national vs. national-level decision-making 
arrangements. Neo-functionalist models 
tend to assume that the supranational 
level of European Union (EU) decision-
making is generally likely to yield more 
efficient, welfare-enhancing pareto-optimal 
policy outcomes – to “upgrade the com-
mon interest”. Intergovernmental models 
suggest, on the other hand, that policy 
outcomes are a product of power strug-
gles between states. Due to variation in 
relative power across states, there are 
likely to be both winners and losers in 
the policy-making process and integration 
outcomes. While all states are typically 
considered to be “net winners”, this does 
not preclude “net losses” for weaker 
states in individual policy areas. Thus, 
while in the aggregate supranational-level 
decision-making may be preferable this 
does not preclude significant disadvan-
tages in individual policy areas. In par-
                                                 
* This is a revised version of a paper previously 
presented at the EUSA 9th Biennial International 
Conference, Austin, Texas, March 31st–April 2nd, 
at the 2004 Annual Conference of the Interna-
tional Studies Association – Southern Region, Co-
lumbia, South Carolina, Oct. 22nd-23rd and the 
29th Annual European Studies Conference, 
Omaha, Nebraska, Oct. 14-16th, 2004. Special 
thanks go to the participants of the ESC, ISA 
and EUSA conferences and to David Cleeton, 
John Glenn, András Inotai, Katie Laatikainen, Jack 
Mutti, Miklós Szanyi and Milada Vachudova for 
insightful comments. I would also like to thank 
the Institute for World Economics (Budapest) for 
allowing me to work at their institute in the 
summer of 2003, 2004 and the winter of 2005. 
I would also like to acknowledge the valuable 
input of my students while teaching a short 
course at the Central European University during 
the winter of 2005. Finally, I would like to 
thank Grinnell College for its funding of summer 
research in Hungary and Lukas Vrba for invalu-
able research assistance. All errors are of course 
my own. 
ticular, latecomers not present at the in-
ception of individual policies are most 
likely to be affected by this type of pol-
icy mismatch.  
This paper analyzes policy develop-
ments related to economic competitiveness 
and development interests and provides 
an analysis of the dominant forces driv-
ing policy output in the New Europe. 
Given that – in the intergovernmental 
model at least – the interests of more 
powerful states are expected to super-
sede those of other states, it is important 
to understand both the potential diver-
gence of policy interests in the New 
Europe and the strain this is likely to 
place on the supranational decision-
making framework. Is policy cohesion 
possible, given the potential divergence of 
interests across the New and Old Mem-
ber States? What kind of solutions will 
ultimately be proposed for regional de-
velopment, corporate taxation, national 
economic competitiveness and what theo-
ries of European integration are best 
suited to explaining these policy out-
comes? How sustainable is decision-
making in the New Europe and how 
compatible are the interests of the New 
and Old Member States in the long 
term? 
Ample signs of the potential for 
emerging policy conflict precede the 
creation of the New Europe. Both France 
and Germany, with the recent addition 
of Poland, have protested against corpo-
rate taxation levels in some of the CEE 
economies. The Central and East Euro-
pean countries (CEEC’s) were accused of 
“fiscal dumping” – i.e. exploiting EU 
structural and cohesion funds (SCF’s) to 
make up for low rates of corporate 
taxation. French Minister of Finance, 
Nicholas Sarkozy even threatened to 
lobby for reduced regional development 
funding should the CEEC’s allow their 
corporate taxation levels to fall below 
the European average (something Ger-
many likewise supports). In the context 
of a meagre allotment of SCF’s for the 
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2004–20061 period and even lower cor-
porate tax rates in Ireland, this comes 
as a rude awakening to the New Mem-
ber States (NMS’s). Moreover, this dis-
cussion compellingly exposes the impor-
tance of interests, states and groups 
within states to the newcomers in the 
European club. 
This paper argues that the New 
Europe is likely to experience a consid-
erable divergence of policy interests as a 
result of the Eastern Enlargement. The 
more advanced EU member states have a 
clear interest in reducing overall expen-
ditures on the SCF’s and in the creation 
of a “level playing field” – reducing the 
role of state subsidies and raising regu-
latory standards in the CEEC’s, putting 
these on a par with Western levels. Less 
advanced states on the other hand are 
far more concerned with overall levels of 
economic competitiveness, sustainable 
economic development and the related 
impact of EU redistributional arrange-
ments. Thus, the NMS’s should have a 
much stronger interest in developing the 
EU’s fiscal tools for promoting economic 
growth and development (in particular 
the SCF’s). Moreover, the NMS’s may 
have an interest in maintaining many of 
the policies that the Old Member States 
(OMS’s) would like to see eliminated – 
e.g. state subsidies and some forms of 
investment promotion incentives. The new 
range of median states – i.e. the former 
beneficiaries of EU SCF’s (Spain, Portu-
gal, Greece and Ireland) – fall in a 
somewhat dubious category. They can 
lobby hard to be included in future 
rounds of EU funding or – failing this – 
join the advanced states in lobbying for 
reduced expenditure and a level playing 
field. 
EU political bargaining during the 
enlargement process and even in the 
New Europe of 25 or 27 member states 
is strongly weighted in favour of the 
larger and more advanced EU member 
states. Moreover, the new Constitutional 
                                                 
1 See the discussion of the SCF’s in Ellison (2005). 
Treaty does not result in any significant 
changes in this regard.2 Thus the benefits 
resulting from the economic and political 
integration of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) will likely accrue primarily 
to the large and more advanced states, 
thereby potentially increasing the degree 
of political division in the New Europe. 
The potential for unanimity voting on 
multi-annual framework agreements – 
i.e. those agreements that affect the dis-
tribution of SCF’s – does make it possi-
ble for the NMS’s to block agreement on 
proposals that fail to satisfy their inter-
ests. However, they are nonetheless in a 
weaker position vis-à-vis the larger 
OMS’s who can just as effectively block 
attempts to bargain significant changes 
to the current policy framework. More-
over, the “enhanced cooperation” clause 
in the Amsterdam, Nice and the new 
Constitutional Treaty may ultimately re-
move any potential for the less advanced 
states to leverage significant concessions 
from the more advanced states. 
 The paper proceeds as follows: 
The first section discusses the competi-
tiveness and economic development con-
cerns of the CEEC’s in the larger context 
of the literature on the “developmental 
state”. The second section takes a look 
at some of the strategies pursued by the 
CEEC’s prior to EU membership and as-
sesses some of the potential weaknesses 
of current economic development in these 
states. The third section takes a look at 
the current and evolving EU policy 
framework. The fourth section looks at 
the future interests and concerns of the 
CEEC’s as they relate to the requirements 
of EU membership, the political bargain-
ing process, and the potential compatibil-
ity or conflict of the EU framework with 
the goals of competitiveness and eco-
nomic development. The final section 
concludes. 
                                                 
2 See for example Ellison (2005). 
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1) IN SEARCH OF 
COMPETITIVENESS 
Economic competitiveness is the subject of 
much current debate both within and far 
beyond the borders of Europe. The ad-
vent of EU membership for 10 new less 
developed states has resulted in a renais-
sance of literature on economic competi-
tiveness in CEE – if indeed one can even 
argue that interest had declined.3 Given 
that EU membership is likely to result in 
a further intensification of economic 
competition across the borders of the 
New Europe, concerns about the future 
prospects of the CEEC’s are at a new 
pitch. This fact has focused renewed at-
tention on the various policy measures 
available in the EU that might assist the 
NMS’s in promoting sustainable, long-
term economic development. As such, the 
Lisbon strategy, the EU’s SCF’s, competi-
tion policy and rules regarding the use 
of state aids define a nexus of highly 
salient and potentially heated policy de-
bate in the New Europe. 
What specific factors drive eco-
nomic competitiveness and the creation 
of dynamic economies is still a question 
of considerable academic and intellectual 
debate. For many, the answer lies in the 
complete elimination of barriers to trade 
and the establishment of free market en-
try.4 For others, the key lies in the re-
                                                 
3 Perusing economics journals in Hungary (e.g. 
Közgazdasági Szemle, Külgazdaság, the working 
papers of the Hungarian Institute for World 
Economics, etc.) one comes across a large num-
ber of articles that address this topic from mul-
tiple directions. Indeed this is nothing new. The 
development of economic competitiveness litera-
ture has been something of a cottage industry in 
CEE ever since the initial stages of transition and 
has not begun to lose momentum with the ad-
vent of EU membership. 
4 See Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner 
(1996). 
moval of the state from its involvement 
in the economy.5 Others still argue for 
inflation targeting.6 For others still, eco-
nomic competitiveness may be a function 
of the government’s role in market-
supporting activities, in particular the 
development of infrastructure and human 
capital. This approach likewise places a 
considerable emphasis on the importance 
of institutions.7 The potential role of ex-
ternal increasing returns, economies of 
scale and economic geography introduce 
a further degree of uncertainty over the 
consequences of economic integration – 
in particular for less developed econo-
mies and in the context of low European 
labour mobility.8 
In recent years, strong intellectual 
and ideological currents have reinforced 
and supported the shift away from state 
involvement in the economy and toward 
a more neo-liberal agenda. Moreover, 
the phenomenon of globalization appears 
to have further strengthened the claim 
that states have no alternative but to 
pursue more neo-liberal agendas. There 
are essentially three core elements of the 
neo-liberal agenda. The first involves a 
narrow attack on the state and its inter-
ventionist role in economic affairs.9 The 
second involves a much broader attack 
on the fundamentals of the practice of 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
                                                 
5 See for example Krugman (1987). Both Tupy 
(2003) and Sachs and Warner (1996) argue, for 
example, that excessive state regulations lead to 
slow economic growth and that EU membership 
will ultimately mean some degree of re-
regulation. 
6 See in particular Fischer, Sahay and Végh 
(1996). 
7 See for example Kolodko (2000?) and Rodrik 
(2002). 
8 See for example Martin (2003) on economic 
geography and labour mobility. See Ellison and 
Hussain (2003) on external increasing returns 
and uncertainty in the context of European inte-
gration. On external increasing returns and eco-
nomic geography see Krugman (1991). 
9 Paul Krugman (1987) argues that governments 
are not able to make economic decisions since 
they are likely to put political interests before 
economic concerns and they lack the relevant 
economic expertise.  
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and promotes in its place export-led in-
dustrialization or even more broadly 
what has come to be referred to as the 
“Washington Consensus”. This Washing-
ton Consensus in particular strongly ad-
vocates the role of the market at the 
expense of the state, exposure to inter-
national competition and the free move-
ment of capital and goods.10 The third 
core element of the neo-liberal agenda 
involves the rollback of the welfare 
state.11  
For states seeking to become more 
economically developed, the Washington 
Consensus and the neo-liberal agenda it 
implies has posed perhaps the most di-
rect threat to national decision-making 
autonomy and the role of government. 
Controversial from the start,12 the Wash-
ington Consensus prescribes a set of pol-
icy measures for states seeking to be-
come more economically developed.13 In 
response to the anti-statist and Washing-
ton Consensus views, a number of au-
thors focus instead on the consequences 
of the withdrawal of the state from the 
realm of economic management. Linda 
                                                 
10 The Washington Consensus is the most proto-
typical expression of what has come to be 
viewed as the neo-liberal agenda. For William-
son’s original elaboration of the Washington Con-
sensus, see Williamson (1990). While Williamson 
himself has explicitly contested the use of the 
term “neo-liberal agenda” (Williamson, 2000), 
this term seems particularly appropriate in con-
trast to the range of alternatives proposed as 
alternatives to the Washington Consensus.  
11 Though this facet of the neo-liberal agenda is 
likewise important, the government’s role in the 
management of the economy is the principal fo-
cus of this paper. 
12 Rodrik (1996) offers one of the more potent 
criticisms. But this approach continues to inspire 
strong criticism (see for example Beeson and 
Islam, 2004; Rodrik, 2002; and Kolodko, 2000?). 
13 In general, the neo-liberal prescription has 
favoured strong measures of fiscal prudence and 
reductions in government expenditure, tax re-
form, competitive exchange rates and secure 
property rights. The Washington Consensus es-
chews any form of market protectionism or state 
involvement and promotes instead extensive price, 
trade and financial liberalization, thorough-going 
privatization of the economy and deregulation. 
Finally, the Washington Consensus supports the 
elimination of barriers to the free entry and exit 
of foreign capital. 
Weiss (2003), for example, argues that 
rather than constraining the behaviour of 
states, globalization has increased the 
likelihood of reliance on and potential 
importance of the state. Rodrik also has 
consistently criticized the notion that the 
removal of the state from the role of 
economic management is a wise strategy. 
His early analysis of the Latin American 
and East Asian cases suggested the role 
of government was crucial to explaining 
the relative success of the East Asian Ti-
gers (1996),14 and more recently Rodrik 
has shifted attention to China and India, 
suggesting again that the role of the 
state is crucial in explaining overall eco-
nomic performance (2002).  
While the notion of the “develop-
mental state” may have lost credibility in 
the late 90’s with the emergence of the 
Asian crisis, many authors still argue 
that the involvement of the state is cru-
cial for achieving successful and sustain-
able economic development.15 Thus much 
research has begun to (re-)focus atten-
tion on the value of institutions and state 
intervention, in particular in areas such 
as human capital and infrastructure. 
And international institutions such as the 
World Bank have more recently come 
back on board with much of this 
agenda.16  
Authors writing on CEE suggest 
these countries have done better than 
countries further East (including Russia) 
precisely because they chose not to fol-
                                                 
14 Previous analyses have likewise suggested that 
state involvement played a strong role in explain-
ing the success of the East Asian economies 
(Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). 
15 See in particular Beeson and Islam (2004), 
Beeson (2003) and Weiss (2003). 
16 See in particular the interview with the World 
Bank’s Executive Director, Carole Brookins, Tran-
sition Newsletter, December, 2003–January, 2004: 
1–3. To some extent, the World Bank has vacil-
lated on these points. For example, the World 
Development Report 1997: The State in a Chang-
ing World likewise pointed to the potential im-
portance of the role of the state, the usefulness 
of industrial policy, the development of infra-
structure, good business–government relations 
and even subsidies (Beeson, 2003: 12). 
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low a strictly neo-liberal approach to 
economic adjustment and renewal (Ko-
lodko, 2000?, 1999; IMEPI-RAN, 2001). 
In the case of the CEEC’s, however, this 
overall picture is complicated by the fact 
that these countries stand before two 
major challenges. On the one hand, they 
face the challenge of globalization as 
they move to market economies and 
greater economic openness. On the other 
hand, they face the challenge of EU 
membership, competition with EU mem-
ber economies and adoption of the EU 
legislative framework. How these states 
have responded to these challenges, what 
factors explain their relative degree of 
success and how they are likely to be 
affected by EU membership is the subject 
of the remainder of this paper. While 
the turn to the market has certainly in-
volved the state in different ways in the 
various CEEC’s, the advent of EU mem-
bership appears more likely to constrain 
the role of the state in these countries.  
The dissenting literature on the 
Washington Consensus is however some-
what vague on the precise form and 
shape of institutions that are likely to 
contribute to economic success. Both 
Rodrik (writing on China and India) and 
Kolodko (writing on Poland) suggest that 
“institutions” broadly defined are the 
crucially neglected variable in develop-
ment literature. But at the same time, no 
precise outline of which institutions are 
most important for successful economic 
development is ever specified. In part, 
this is by design. Both of these authors 
argue that universally applicable devel-
opment models do not exist. The virtue 
of the individual cases they discuss is 
that the governments in question were 
attentive to local economic specificities 
and local institutional and power rela-
tions. The only strong commonality 
across individual cases lies in the au-
thors’ insistence upon the importance of 
the role of the state.  
Thus, the next section of this paper 
will illuminate the institutional and stra-
tegic features used by the CEEC’s to 
promote economic growth and develop-
ment. As discussed below, these devel-
opment strategies have important implica-
tions for the potential compatibility of 
CEE interests with the basic features of 
the EU policy framework discussed in the 
following section. While this paper fo-
cuses predominantly on Hungary, it 
likewise discusses some data from and 
related implications for the remaining 
CEEC’s. 
2) TOOLS OF THE PAST AND 
TOOLS OF THE FUTURE? 
National-level CEE economic competitive-
ness strategies exhibit considerable varia-
tion. While the Hungarian case exhibits 
similarities with other countries in the 
region, it also exhibits many differences. 
For one, Hungary started quite early 
both with an extensive project of privati-
zation and a comparatively dynamic 
program for attracting FDI. The remain-
ing CEEC’s did not really initiate similar 
programs until much later. Moreover, 
while Hungary was the principal recipi-
ent of FDI in CEE throughout most of 
the period from 1989 until about 1997, 
the remaining CEEC’s only began to 
catch-up after 1997. As Sass notes, if we 
look at accumulated per capita stocks of 
FDI, Hungary still remains the principal 
investment target in CEE. Second, the 
relative degree of penetration of foreign 
capital in Hungary greatly surpasses that 
of other CEEC’s (Hunya, 2004; Sass, 
2003: 14). 
Throughout the 1990’s, the CEEC’s 
were primarily focused on the shift from 
centrally planned command economies 
over to market economies and on the 
privatization of industry. Over this pe-
riod, there have been a number of im-
portant successes. Hungary in particular 
has been remarkably successful at at-
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tracting foreign investment capital. The 
Hungarian economy is almost entirely 
privatized. Thus, if any of the NMS’s are 
genuinely prepared to adopt current EU 
competitiveness and industrial policy 
strategies, it may be Hungary. As Hunya 
notes, the degree of foreign penetration 
of the Hungarian manufacturing sector 
is extensive. In 2001, some 72.5% of 
output in the manufacturing sector in 
Hungary was attributable to foreign 
owned firms (2004: 15). Apart from 
1995, 2001 was one of the biggest years 
for FDI flows into Hungary (Sass, 2004: 
68). As Sass points out, 26,000 firms 
benefiting from foreign participation ac-
count for 80% of trade (2004: 64). As 
Szanyi notes, in the year 2000, foreign 
investment enterprises (FIE’s) also played 
a determinant role in net sales revenue 
(73.7%), value-added production (70%), 
and in manufacturing were responsible 
for 47.1% of employment (2003?: 9). 
At least one author suggests the 
corporate taxation policies of the New 
and Old Member States have begun to 
diverge. The author notes that from an 
average 2% difference in statutory cor-
porate tax rates in 1999 across the Old 
and New Member states emerged and 
this difference increased to 6% in 2003. 
Moreover, many countries in CEE envi-
sion still further reductions in the level 
of corporate taxation (UNECE, 2004a: 
126, 128). Yet this image papers over 
the much more generous taxation and 
investment incentive regimes available to 
foreign (and domestic) investors alike 
during large parts of the transition pe-
riod. If these investment promotion 
schemes were more consistently included 
in the numbers above and over a longer 
time frame (from 1990 to the present), 
there would be considerably more con-
vergence in the corporate tax rates 
across the Old and New Member states 
in the more recent period. To some ex-
tent, the reduction of corporate tax rates 
may actually compensate for the loss of 
other tools used to promote economic 
competitiveness. 
Economic competitiveness has been 
promoted in different ways by the Hun-
garian government. Tax benefits/holidays, 
monopoly concessions, as well as protec-
tive trade barriers17 have all been intro-
duced in order to encourage investment. 
A large number of the firms that have 
taken advantage of these concessions are 
foreign. This does not mean that no 
Hungarian firms have benefited from 
these arrangements. But foreign firms – 
due to the magnitude of the required 
investments – have been among the prin-
cipal beneficiaries. In Hungary, invest-
ment incentives were introduced even 
prior to the 1989 collapse of the East 
Bloc. As Éltető notes, the XXIV/1988 law 
on foreign investment permitted foreign 
firms who invested in a select set of ac-
tivities18 to obtain a tax write-off of 
100% for the first five years and 60% 
for the following five years. Tax exemp-
tions of 60% and 40% respectively were 
possible for investments in other eco-
nomic activities. In order to receive these 
tax reductions, the foreign investor share 
had to be at least 30% of a minimum 
capital stock totalling more than 25 mil-
lion Hungarian Forint and at least 50% 
of the revenues of the firm had to be 
earned from manufacturing. For smaller 
foreign investments, firms could deduct 
20% of their corporate tax if the foreign 
investment share was at least 20% of the 
total capital stock or totalled more than 
5 million Hungarian Forint (Éltető, 1998: 
9). 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of these trade barriers, see 
Nagy (1994). Nagy argues that it was primarily 
the interests of large Western producers that 
were protected in the early European or Associa-
tion Agreements, while the interests of domestic 
producers were largely ignored. This suggests 
that these concessions were largely made in or-
der to attract foreign investment to the region. 
18 These activities were; ‘electronics, production of 
components for vehicles, production of machine 
tools, machinery components, production of 
pharmaceuticals, production of food-processing 
products, agricultural production, tourism, public 
telecommunication services and environmental 
protection products or equipment’ (Éltető, 1998: 
9). 
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Future modifications of the 1988 
law impacted either the minimum capital 
stock thresholds or the allowable share 
of the tax write-offs. For example, as 
Éltető notes, the 1991 Act on Corporate 
Taxation increased the capital stock 
threshold for the 60%-40% tax reduction 
category to 50 million Hungarian Forint. 
Though these investment incentives were 
abolished in December 1993, from 1994 
on, firms were permitted to apply for 
individual tax exemptions for foreign 
investments of “outstanding size and im-
portance”. The 1995 amendment to the 
1991 corporate tax law made all firms – 
domestic and foreign19 – eligible for 5 
year tax exemptions of 50% for invest-
ments above 1 billion Hungarian Forint 
leading in the first year to increases in 
exports of 600 million Hungarian Forint 
or 25% of previous export values. Five-
year tax reductions of 100% were al-
lowed in areas where the rate of unem-
ployment exceeded 15%. Further tax 
preferences amounting to 6% of the total 
amount of investment were likewise 
available for investments in regions 
where unemployment exceeded 15% or in 
so-called “entrepreneurial zones”.20 
The 1996 LXXXI law introduced a 
number of new investment promotion 
incentives. For example, a 5 year 100% 
tax holiday was available for investments 
in less developed regions. Investments of 
more than 1 billion Hungarian Forint 
and leading to turnover valued at more 
than 25% of the original investment and 
at least 600 million Forint in the first 
year were eligible for a 5 year 50% tax 
reduction. A 5 year 50% tax reduction 
was available for investments in hotel 
facilities over 1 billion Hungarian Forint 
and leading to an increase in turnover 
of at least 25% and at least 600 million 
Hungarian Forint. Hotel facilities built in 
                                                 
19 This is one of the first instances of EU pres-
sure and may have helped diminish complaints 
that the Hungarian government was only helping 
promote foreign and not domestic investors. 
20 Ibid: 9-10; Magyar Közlöny, 1995, No. 108: 
6285–6. 
less developed regions were eligible for a 
5 year 100% tax reduction (CompLex, 
2005; Antalóczy and Sass, 2003: 12; 
Szanyi, 2003: 15). 
The most liberal Hungarian corpo-
rate tax law went into effect on January 
1st, 1998.21 As noted above, firms invest-
ing more than 10 billion Forint (approx. 
$44.5 million) and creating at least 500 
new jobs were granted 10 year tax holi-
days. Firms investing in the less devel-
oped regions of Hungary were only re-
quired to invest 3 billion Forint (or 
approx. $13 million), employ at least 100 
new workers and to increase turnover 
by 5% of the total investment cost 
(Éltető, 1998: 9–10). According to repre-
sentatives interviewed at the Hungarian 
Ministry of Finance, these tax holidays 
were valid for all of the Hungarian op-
erations of the investing firm (not just 
the actual facility in which the firm had 
invested). While both domestic and for-
eign firms were eligible for these incen-
tives, foreign firms were the principal 
beneficiaries since few domestic firms 
had sufficient investment resources. 
Further generous investment incen-
tives were promoted with the innovation 
of so-called “industrial parks”. The inno-
vation of industrial parks in Hungary 
predates government involvement and 
fiscal support. Prior to 1996, these parks 
were predominantly financed through 
private foreign investments (AHIP, 1999: 
97). From approximately 1996 on, how-
ever, the Hungarian government – in 
part as an attempt to promote the de-
velopment of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SME’s) – progressively pro-
moted the establishment of industrial 
                                                 
21 There is some confusion in the literature over 
the actual date on which this set of investment 
incentives was introduced. Éltető accurately notes 
that this law was introduced in 1998 (Éltető, 
1998: 9–10). Later work notes the date of 1996 
(see for example, Szanyi, 2003: 15; and 
Antalóczy and Sass, 2003: 12). According to the 
Hungarian legislative texts, this amendment to the 
1996 LXXXI law was introduced with the 1997 
CVI law and made retroactive to Dec. 31st, 1996 
(CompLex, 2005). 
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parks. From 1996, firms investing in 
such parks were eligible for a 5 year 
tax holiday (Éltető, 1998: 11–12). In addi-
tion to tax holidays, the government 
dedicated 400 million Hungarian Forint 
to their development in 1996 and 800 
million Hungarian Forint per year from 
1997–1999 (AHIP, 1999: 98). 
The Hungarian government likewise 
made available a number of additional 
investment funds to which firms could 
apply for grants, interest-free loans, in-
terest subsidies and even direct state 
participation. For example, between 1991 
and 1994 the Investment Incentive Fund 
distributed approximately 100 billion 
Hungarian Forint to 98 different “high 
technology” projects – primarily the 
automotive industry and suppliers. This 
investment fund was replaced by two 
new funds in 1995, the Economic Devel-
opment Fund and the Allocation Fund 
(Éltető, 1998: 10–11). According to 
Szanyi, the government also offered tax 
reductions in the first year for invest-
ments in R&D activities for up to 20% 
of the actual costs of the investment 
(2003: 16). 
Hungary also pursued the creation 
of industrial free trade zones (IFTZ’s). 
These free trade zones were first intro-
duced in 1982, long prior to the collapse 
of the East Bloc. As both Sass and 
Antalóczy note, there were several ad-
vantages of setting up IFTZ’s.22 First, 
companies could import equipment, ma-
chinery and other production inputs 
without having to pay import duties. 
Second, they could take advantage of 
local labour. The only restrictions on 
firms in IFTZ’s were that they produce 
for exports. Over some 100 firms had 
set up industrial free trade zones by 
January 2002. Firms setting up produc-
tion in IFTZ’s were likewise eligible for 
the remaining investment promotion in-
centives noted above, so that it was 
quite possible for firms to compound 
                                                 
22 Sass (2004: 75). See also Antalóczy and Sass 
(2001) and Antalóczy (1999). 
these two sources of investment promo-
tion. Further, IFTZ’s rapidly grew to 
produce a formidable share of Hungar-
ian exports. For example, Antalóczy 
notes that between 1995 and 1998, the 
IFTZ share of Hungarian exports rose 
from 10.6% to 36% (1999: 59). 
Sass (2003) argues that the role of 
fiscal incentives was significant in Hun-
gary and played an important role in 
attracting foreign capital. Other countries 
in the region – in particular the Czech 
Republic and Poland – did not begin to 
attract comparable amounts of FDI until 
1997 and beyond, long after the Hun-
garian market was already substantially 
saturated and after these latter countries 
had begun to adopt investment promo-
tion policies similar to those in Hungary. 
Moreover, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia never established IFTZ’s,23 
and the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
only began creating industrial parks af-
ter 2000 (Sass, 2003: 17). Hungary was 
likewise the first country in CEE to seri-
ously consider privatizing its “core” stra-
tegic industries. According to Mihályi, 
the other CEEC’s resisted privatizing sec-
tors such as energy, banking, telecom-
munications and chemicals until 1994 or 
1995 (2001: 72). These factors, as well 
as many of the legislative decisions 
granting foreign investors easy and 
broad access to Hungarian industry 
helped Hungary to move forward more 
rapidly and attract more investment 
capital than other CEEC’s. 
Fiscal aids granted in the form of 
tax benefits amount, in Hungary, to a 
significant overall share of state aid. Ac-
cording to the report of the Hungarian 
State Aid Monitoring Office (2002) – 
and depending on whether or not state 
                                                 
23 Poland did establish “special economic zones”, 
but according to Uminski, the regulations associ-
ated with them were too cumbersome to success-
fully attract significant amounts of FDI (2001: 
91–2). Nevertheless, Poland requested a transition 
period for these zones until 2017 that was 
turned down by the Commission (EP Fact Sheet, 
2003). 
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support for the railroads are excluded 
from these calculations – state aids in 
the form of tax benefits amount respec-
tively to either 76.8% or 46.4% of all 
state aids in the year 2000. This level of 
state support was quite common for sev-
eral years. Between 1998 and the year 
2000, tax benefits amounted to between 
72.9% and 76.8% of state aid.24 In pre-
vious years, the share of tax benefits in 
overall state aid was smaller (58.7% and 
58.2% in 1996 and 1997 respectively), 
but previously the Hungarian government 
granted significantly more direct support 
to the steel sector. In the form of tax 
concessions, in 1998 the Hungarian gov-
ernment granted 381.4 million Euros in 
tax benefits, 290.6 million Euros in 
1999, and 371.3 million Euros in 2000.25 
Many of these arrangements met 
with problems in the area of competition 
policy and state aids during the negotia-
tion of the EU Accession Treaty.26 Thus, 
in December 2003, a government decree 
was issued, effective January, 2003, that 
introduced the EU required aid-intensity 
limits for investment promotion. On the 
basis of the amended 1996 tax law, 
firms investing 10 billion Hungarian 
Forint in developed regions and 3 billion 
Hungarian Forint in less developed re-
gions are now eligible for a tax deduc-
tion up to 35%-50% of the original in-
vestment depending on the region in 
which the investment takes place (not a 
0% rate on all Hungarian operations 
over a 10 year period as was the case 
under the 1996 law).27 This deduction 
                                                 
24 See the report of the State Aid Monitoring 
Office (2002: 17, Table 9). 
25 Ibid. (2000: 21 Table A2; 2002: 35 Table A2, 
37 Table A4). 
26 Some problems arose even prior to this date. 
For example, the EU used the Association Agree-
ment as the foundation for objecting that tax 
reductions based on export performance were a 
form of export promotion. As a result, Hungary 
altered the tax law to instead focus on output in 
1996 (Éltető, 1998: 9).  
27 Based on an interview with the Hungarian 
Ministry of Finance, the actual shares are 35% 
for investments in the Budapest area, 40% in the 
Pest country area, 45% for investments in West-
can be carried forward for up to 5 
years until the entire 35-50% of the 
original investment has been deducted. 
Since this revised strategy qualifies as 
“regional development”, it has been ap-
proved under the framework of EU re-
strictions on state aids. 
At the same time Hungary was re-
quired to revise many of the original 
agreements made with large foreign in-
vestors between 1996 and 2002. Accord-
ing to representatives from the Hungar-
ian Ministry of Finance, the agreement 
between Hungary and the EU essentially 
allows large investors who started in-
vestments prior to January 2000 to re-
coup up to 75% of the “eligible invest-
ment costs”, for investments occurring 
after January 1st, 2000, the amount if 
50%. Special agreements were put into 
effect for the auto industry, reducing 
these limits even further (European 
Commission, 2002:19). As industrial free 
trade zones were deemed incompatible 
with EU regulations, Hungary and other 
CEEC’s likewise had to discontinue their 
use. However, given that the predomi-
nant share of trade of these industrial 
free trade zones took place with other 
EU member states and given that goods 
can now move freely without import du-
ties in the single market, the actual im-
pact of this outcome is presumably neg-
ligible. 
However, the January 2003 changes 
to the corporate tax law raise concerns. 
Foreign direct investment – despite Hun-
gary’s remarkable ability to attract for-
eign capital in the earlier transition years 
– has declined recently, leaving analysts 
trying to understand what has happened. 
Apart from the general decline in for-
eign direct investment in 2001 and 
2002, some blame the decline in Hun-
gary on the inadequacy of the current 
law. The Hungarian corporate tax rate 
was further amended in 2004, reducing 
                                                                          
ern Hungary, and 50% for investments in the 
remaining and typically less developed regions of 
Hungary (this last category is the largest). 
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it from 18% to 16%.28 As suggested by 
representatives from the Ministry of Fi-
nance, the Hungarian government would 
not have adopted the new January 2003 
revisions had it not been for the obliga-
tions of EU membership and the adop-
tion of the Acquis. Whether or not these 
factors are directly responsible for the 
Hungarian rate of FDI is more complex. 
For one, FDI inflows rose again substan-
tially in 2004.29 For another, the end of 
privatization in Hungary as well as 
world business cycle effects have all 
played a role in the overall decline in 
FDI inflows. 
The above methods are not the only 
way in which the Hungarian government 
has attempted to encourage foreign in-
vestors to locate in Hungary. Nor is this 
the only practice threatened by the re-
quirement of adopting EU law. A num-
ber of “concessionary” or monopoly 
agreements were likewise negotiated be-
tween the Hungarian government and 
foreign investors in order to attract siz-
able investments in Hungarian infrastruc-
ture. In the case of Matáv, the Hungar-
ian telecommunications company, the 
government was able to attract and re-
tain foreign investment by guaranteeing 
a national monopoly in the telecommuni-
cations sector for the first 8 years. 
Without this arrangement and the attrac-
tion of a national monopoly, Matáv 
might not have been able to put together 
the capital necessary to rebuild its tele-
communications infrastructure.30 Similar 
                                                 
28 KPMG Media Release: “Corporate Tax Rates 
Continue to Fall Worldwide”, March 23, 2004. 
29 Though the figures here include estimates of 
reinvested profits for 2004, there was a substan-
tial increase in FDI inflows in 2004. The most 
recent FDI data (including reinvested profits) is 
available on the website of the Hungarian Na-
tional Bank (www.mnb.hu). 
30 The offer of a national monopoly was clearly 
a tool used to attract foreign investment (see for 
example Szanyi, 1993). Matáv’s financial position 
in the early 90’s made it virtually impossible to 
undertake the investments required to successfully 
modernize Hungarian telecommunications. In the 
late 80’s, Matáv published a 10-year plan that 
estimated the cost of required investments at 380 
billion HUF. At the same time, the government’s 
arrangements were made in the mobile 
telephone sector with first two and then 
later three different foreign investors. 
The monopoly or cartel agreements in 
these sectors were initiated in 1992, and 
the mobile phone sector agreement was 
re-negotiated in 1994 in order to admit 
one new market player.31 Both of these 
concession arrangements had to be ter-
minated as one of the conditions of EU 
membership.  
Similar arrangements were also 
made in order to promote investment in 
the construction of Hungarian motorways 
and in the privatization of Hungarian 
power plants. Apart from the publicly 
owned MVM, as noted above, and the 
Hungarian nuclear power plant (Paks), 
all remaining power stations in Hungary 
were privatized with the help of prefer-
ential agreements including explicit long-
term price and 8% profit guarantees. EU 
membership has explicitly affected only 
some of these agreements. In the energy 
sector, for example, the complete liber-
alization of access to the energy grid 
will be introduced as of 2004 (for all 
non-household energy consumption) and 
2007 (for all consumption). It is not 
immediately clear how this will affect the 
preferential purchase agreements signed 
by MVM with various private energy 
producers, but it is likely this will have 
a negative impact on MVM’s bottom 
line.32 Most of the Hungarian motorway 
                                                                          
annual expenditure on all infrastructure needs at 
that time amounted to 30 billion HUF (Tóth, 
1993: 39–41). 
31 Deutsche Telekom was the principal investor in 
Matáv, while Pannon and Westel were the prin-
cipal investors in the mobile phone sector. Voda-
fone was the third Western company admitted to 
the Hungarian mobile phone market in 1994. 
32 There have already been significant problems 
in this regard, since the preferential agreements 
that Hungary signed have bound the MVM to 
pay more to electricity producers than the sale 
price to consumers. Moreover, these preferential 
purchasing agreements are valid for some 20–25 
years from the date of signing (approximately 
1997). Thus MVM (and the Hungarian govern-
ment) will most likely compensate significant 
losses in the energy sector for years to come 
(2017–2023) (see Bakos, 2001). Complete liberali-
zation of the energy sector may lower energy 
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agreements ran their course prior to the 
final date of enlargement. Thus, as long 
as Hungary observes EU public pro-
curement regulations, future agreements 
will not likely be greatly affected by EU 
membership. 
Hungarian strategies have gradually 
begun to shift away from simple capital 
attraction schemes to strategies promot-
ing the diffusion of knowledge and tech-
nology and the continued clustering of 
economic and related R&D activity. Thus 
while some of the more attractive fiscal 
tax-based mechanisms noted above have 
been curtailed or reduced in scope, a 
new generation of programs is gradually 
being put in place. These programs at-
tempt to respond in important ways to 
some of the deficiencies of previous capi-
tal-seeking strategies and attempt to ex-
pand R&D and build upon potential syn-
ergies across and between firms and 
various types of research institutions. The 
Hungarian government’s “Smart Hun-
gary” program for example, applied to 
investments as of December 31st, 2002 
and offered additional investment promo-
tion incentives to support the develop-
ment of technology. Firms investing in 
R&D, for example, were able to deduct 
up to 200% of those costs from their 
corporate tax base.33 
Buzás and Szanyi (2004) point to 
the potential importance of the more 
“knowledge-based” focus of a number of 
government programs geared toward 
promoting both the development of tech-
nology and its diffusion. The authors 
seem most enthusiastic about the devel-
opment of “Cooperation Research Cen-
ters” (CRC’s) in 2001 funded by gov-
                                                                          
supply prices, having a more serious impact on 
the related costs to the Hungarian government 
(and possibly the Hungarian consumer). Bakos 
estimates potential losses at 300 billion Hungar-
ian Forint (2001: 1129). However, this estimate 
does not successfully take into account the costs 
of liberalization, suggesting that the total loss 
could be even higher. 
33 See both the program announcement from the 
Ministry of Economy and Transport (2002), and 
Ernst & Young (2003: 33-4). 
ernment grants of between 0.2 and 1 
million US Dollars and established at dif-
ferent universities in Hungary. One of 
the goals of these research centres was 
to include business partners in their ac-
tivities. CRC’s have been established in 
Budapest (2), Pécs (in cooperation with 
partners in Budapest and Szeged), Vesz-
prém and Szeged. Further projects have 
been established since this initial set of 
five. Furthermore, the cooperative re-
search these centres engage in is also 
eligible for tax deductions (Buzás and 
Szanyi, 2004: 22–3).  
As Buzás and Szanyi note, other 
projects the government has initiated ap-
pear less successful. For example, the 
Hungarian government offered grants to 
entrepreneurs with academic scientific 
backgrounds to turn their knowledge 
into business enterprises. But this project 
has generated a small number of appli-
cations. Further efforts have been made 
to promote the development of Technol-
ogy Learning Offices (TLO’s) in the uni-
versity setting. However, according to the 
authors, the lack of available capital has 
left TLO’s at the mercy of investors. Few 
patents have remained in the hands of 
the TLO’s, making them weak dissemina-
tors of technology (Buzás and Szanyi, 
2004: 25–6). 
Industrial parks constitute a final 
category discussed by Buzás and Szanyi. 
While the authors seem less enthusiastic 
about these parks, their numbers have 
increased substantially in Hungary. As 
noted by the Association of Hungarian 
Industrial Parks (AHIP/IPE), there were 
165 industrial parks distributed through-
out Hungary by May 2004.34 However, 
Buzás and Szanyi remain sanguine about 
their potential impact on the diffusion of 
technology. As the authors note, Infopark 
in Budapest – one of the more success-
ful industrial parks – brings together the 
Ministry of the Economy, the Prime Min-
ister’s Office, the Budapest University of 
                                                 
34 See the website of the Association of Hungar-
ian Industrial Parks (http://www.datanet.hu/ipe/). 
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Technology and the Eötvös Loránd Uni-
versity of Sciences (ELTE), and has at-
tracted the participation of large firms 
(Matáv, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Nortel 
and Panasonic). However, Infopark has 
not been successful at attracting further 
investors or in achieving more central-
ized forms of information sharing. Insuf-
ficient centralization of technology ser-
vices has led each firm to create its own 
services. Thus little sharing of technology 
occurs (2004: 28). 
Something of a consensus is emerg-
ing about the need to go beyond simple 
privatization and industrial restructuring 
in the CEE economies. While this litera-
ture typically does not criticize privatiza-
tion and foreign direct investment (FDI), 
it does suggest the accumulation of for-
eign capital alone is not sufficient to 
achieving sustainable long-term patterns 
of economic development. As Szanyi 
points out, previously the principal indi-
cator of economic competitiveness was 
thought to be the introduction of techno-
logically sophisticated production tech-
niques. Increasing FDI specialization in 
technology intensive economic branches 
was seen as an indicator of overall eco-
nomic competitiveness. As Szanyi notes, 
current research suggests the actual 
“technology and knowledge content” of 
the work performed in CEEC’s more 
strongly emphasizes the assembly of 
products and less frequently their design 
and development. Thus increasingly theo-
retical and empirical work has begun to 
measure the share of the “local contribu-
tion” (2003?: 5).  
In order to assess the compatibility 
of the EU policy framework, a clear pic-
ture of current deficiencies in the pat-
tern of development is required. Four 
questions are most relevant to determin-
ing the degree to which multinational 
affiliates or domestic firms are develop-
ing sustainable, long-term patterns of 
economic development. First, to what de-
gree do the activities of Hungarian affili-
ates transcend simple assembly work and 
involve the accumulation of organiza-
tional and research-related tasks in the 
hands of affiliates or supplier firms (no-
tion of “embeddedness”). Second, to what 
degree does the presence of foreign mul-
tinationals lead to technology spillover to 
other local firms. Third, to what degree 
has the R&D activity of multinationals 
been transferred to local firms. And a 
fourth and related question, to what de-
gree are domestic firms incorporated 
into the production (supplier) networks 
of larger foreign multinationals operating 
on domestic soil.35 This last point is 
strongly linked to the first and third, 
since many assume the integration of 
domestic suppliers into the production 
networks of locally established foreign 
multinationals may also facilitate the 
process of technological spillover. 
Response to these points is mixed. 
The relative degree of “embeddedness” of 
Hungarian affiliates is thought to be su-
perficial (Szalavetz, 2003). As Szalavetz 
points out, the degree of integration of 
Hungarian affiliates into the global pro-
duction networks of foreign multinational 
partners is ‘thin’, i.e. the range of poten-
tial responsibilities of Hungarian affiliates 
is limited by the demands of foreign 
multinational headquarters. Thus Szalav-
etz finds that the Hungarian affiliates of 
foreign multinational networks are 
caught up in hierarchically fixed vertical 
production networks leaving them vul-
nerable to the whims of foreign capital 
and fluctuations in the international 
market. Pavlínek comes to similar con-
clusions adding that vertical integration 
makes local firms more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the international economy 
and to the strategic decisions of multina-
tional firms (2004: 52). 
The rate of technological diffusion 
is likewise typically given low marks. 
While direct recipients of FDI have often 
seen significant changes in their techno-
logical capacity (Sass, 2004: 81), the rate 
at which technology has diffused across 
                                                 
35 A good overview of the literature on these last 
two points is provided by Sass (2004). 
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firm boundaries is more controversial. 
Some analyses even suggest the principal 
changes in productivity in the late 90’s 
were more the result of labour shedding 
than the introduction of new technology 
(Novák, 1999). The evidence on actual 
technological spillovers is thin. Novák 
(2003), for example, finds there has 
been only a marginal impact on domestic 
firms and that competition effects and 
the presence of linkages with foreign 
multinationals had a stronger impact on 
technological change. Pavlínek likewise 
surveys a number of authors who find 
little or no evidence for technological 
spillover (2004). Schoors and Van der 
Tol (2002) are among the few to find 
significant positive evidence for spillover. 
The principal barriers to technological 
spillover appear to be weak linkages 
with domestic firms and/or attempts by 
foreign affiliates to control the likelihood 
of spillover.36 
With respect to the remaining 
points, there are important anecdotal ex-
amples of the extensive transfer of capi-
tal, technology and research and innova-
tion potential. General Electric (GE), for 
example, transferred both production 
and R&D activities to Hungarian soil. 
GE’s investments in the Hungarian firm 
Tungsram have ultimately resulted in the 
transfer of 90% of GE’s European pro-
duction activity and 50% of GE’s global 
R&D activities to Hungary (Berend, 
2000: 58). A number of other firms 
have likewise made significant investments 
in R&D centres. Pavlínek notes that the 
motor-building part of Germany’s Audi 
completed a new R&D centre in Győr, 
Hungary in 2001, while the German 
truck and bus brake manufacturer 
Knorr-Bremse built an R&D centre in 
Budapest in 1999. Other examples can 
be found for neighbouring countries 
                                                 
36 On this last point, Lorentzen and Mollgard 
(2002) find that many investors in CEE imposed 
“vertical restraint agreements” prohibiting affili-
ates from using transferred technology for pro-
duction activities outside the framework of the 
joint-venture agreement. Such agreements are 
illegal under EU law. 
(Pavlínek, 2004: 62). The Hungarian In-
vestment and Trade Development Agency 
(ITDH) points to the R&D activities of 
some 30 large corporations as an indica-
tion of important R&D activity locating 
in Hungary (Kilian, 2003: 14). And Sass 
notes that firms such as Nokia, Ericsson, 
Siemens and Compaq have all transferred 
parts of their R&D activities to Hungary 
(2004: 81).  
In general, satisfaction with the 
transfer of R&D activity is low. Pavlínek, 
for example, points out that there is an 
international hierarchy of R&D activities. 
Large multinational firms are likely to 
keep their primary R&D activities close 
to their national headquarters and may 
even transfer R&D activities from affili-
ates to the multinational headquarters. 
When R&D activities are transferred to 
local affiliates, these are likely to be re-
lated to either local product development 
or to small-scale applied research (2004: 
59). All in all, Pavlínek is quite sceptical 
about the likely transfer of extensive 
R&D activities to CEE. R&D activity has 
declined dramatically from its previous 
levels just prior to the transition. Havas, 
for example, notes that R&D expendi-
tures in Hungary amounted to some 
2.3% of GDP in 1988. However, by 
1999, this sum had dropped dramatically 
to approximately 0.68% of GDP. On the 
other hand, for what is presumably the 
same period, the OMS’s R&D expendi-
tures average around 1.8-2% of GDP 
(2001: 11–12). While few expect Hun-
gary’s R&D expenditure to reach pre-
1989 levels,37 the gap between the 
OMS’s and CEEC’s is a cause for con-
cern. 
There are examples of increasing 
links between suppliers and MNC affili-
ates in Hungary. Sass points to differ-
ences in the types of FDI and their rela-
tive impact on supplier networks. Privati-
zation FDI, for example, appears to have 
                                                 
37 The EU’s Lisbon Agenda encourages countries 
to bring their national-level R&D expenditures up 
to 3% of GDP by 2010. 
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led frequently to the maintenance of lo-
cal supplier networks, while Greenfield 
FDI (investment in new production facili-
ties) is more frequently associated with 
weak links between local suppliers and 
foreign affiliates (Sass, 2004: 79). An 
interesting comparison in this regard is 
that between FDI in the car industry in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. In 
Hungary, most investment in the car in-
dustry takes the form of Greenfield in-
vestments (though prior to WWI there 
had been a car industry in Hungary, 
during the socialist era there was no car 
production in Hungary). Thus, FDI in the 
car industry in Hungary had no pre-
existing network of suppliers to integrate 
into the regional investment and produc-
tion network and there was no pre-
existing Hungarian auto-manufacturing 
firm that could have been privatized 
(Sass, 2004: 80). On the other hand, ac-
cording to Pavlínek, in the Czech Repub-
lic the privatization of Skoda led to the 
restructuring of Skoda’s pre-existing 
supplier network and thus to a far 
greater level of local integration. At the 
same time, Pavlínek points out problems 
with the degree of “embeddedness” of 
local suppliers, noting that they perform 
only minor assembly operations for 
products primarily produced elsewhere 
(2004: 54–5). 
Even with all the different govern-
ment programs introduced to promote 
greater levels of R&D and technological 
diffusion, there may still be significant 
barriers restricting the likely impact of 
such efforts. Taking Szalavetz’s approach, 
local affiliates, for example, have insuffi-
cient latitude to deepen their sphere of 
responsibility vis-à-vis their multinational 
headquarters. Ownership barriers make 
it difficult for affiliates of large multina-
tional firms to autonomously define their 
sphere of operation. In this sense, hier-
archical relationships with MNC’s may 
represent inflexible vertical barriers that 
impede the development of horizontal 
activities.38 At the same time, it may be 
possible for domestic firms to engage in 
such practices more easily than for fully 
owned foreign affiliates. Videoton is a 
good example of a Hungarian firm 
whose diversified production strategies 
are not dependent upon any one MNC 
production goal. This presumably de-
pends on the fact that Videoton is a 
publicly traded firm, while other 
greenfield type foreign affiliates are 
100% (or very close to 100%) foreign 
owned.39 
In this regard, both the degree of 
incorporation into core-periphery net-
works and the degree of foreign owner-
ship may ultimately prove to be a liabil-
ity rather than an asset. The greater the 
share of fully owned foreign firms and 
the greater the share of foreign owner-
ship in individual firms, the more diffi-
cult it may be to promote deeper em-
beddedness in multinational production 
strategies. 100% foreign owned affiliates 
again may have little authority to engage 
in the diversification of tasks, whereas 
publicly traded Hungarian firms are po-
tentially better suited to do so. Thus the 
degree of foreign ownership may para-
doxically hinder the creation of sustain-
able economic development goals. 
Identifying which factors best ex-
plain the ability of CEEC’s to go beyond 
economic growth to real economic devel-
opment has become a primary focus of 
current research. The implication is that 
mere capital deepening – improvements 
in the capital/labour ratio – fail to cre-
                                                 
38 Sass, citing Vince, essentially makes this claim 
(2004: 80). 
39 Pavlínek notes a similar example in the Czech 
firm PAL Praha which manufactures small elec-
tric engines for a larger foreign firm (Magna). 
Within the context of a joint venture project, 
PAL invested in its own R&D center for which it 
remains fully responsible, thereby retaining con-
siderable managerial autonomy from Magna. Nor 
does PAL transfer its R&D results to Magna 
(2004: 62). Such a constellation would presuma-
bly not be possible for most MNC affiliates with-
out the degree of managerial autonomy provided 
by the joint venture relationship between PAL and 
Magna. 
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ate the foundations for long-term eco-
nomic development. While capital deepen-
ing may improve productivity and mod-
ernize technology, this should not be 
equated with “know-how” or the capac-
ity to produce new technologies, to inno-
vate and thus to promote long-term eco-
nomic development. According to this 
logic, achieving domestically driven eco-
nomic growth and capital deepening de-
pends on the ability to spearhead techno-
logical innovation on its own account 
and not as a result of exogenous fac-
tors. Such an account does not denigrate 
the value of imported technology and 
capital deepening – by all accounts, FDI 
brings with it productivity improvements 
and thus the potential for economic 
growth. But complete reliance on exoge-
nous forms of technology and innovation 
potential risks creating dependency and 
may fail to create the necessary condi-
tions for long-term sustainable economic 
development in CEE. 
Considerations of this type also 
raise concerns regarding the relative vul-
nerability of the CEEC’s to capital mobil-
ity. If these countries are dependent 
upon external sources for the degree of 
capital deepening and ultimately innova-
tion potential, then the footloose nature 
of investment capital poses real problems 
for the future competitiveness and sus-
tainability of CEE economic development. 
Such concerns are reinforced by current 
discussion of the declining rate of for-
eign direct investment in Hungary and in 
particular whether FDI is likely to move 
further East or even to Asia (Kalotay, 
2003). Though FDI flows rising again in 
2004, even with the inclusion of rein-
vested profits in the calculation of FDI 
flows (omitted by previous Hungarian 
FDI flow data), inflows in 2003 were 
almost half those of inflows in 2001 
(Sass, 2004: 68). 
There are significant examples of 
foreign multinationals leaving the terri-
tory to produce further East.40 As Pav-
línek notes, there are even examples of 
producers trying to minimize their sunk 
costs in order to retain greater geo-
graphic flexibility. Pavlínek points to the 
example of a supplier firm that owns 
the machinery and equipment in a plant 
in the Czech Republic, but not the actual 
building (2004: 58). The smaller individ-
ual NMS’s and the larger individual 
MNC’s, the more vulnerable are individ-
ual states. The Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia are increasingly dependent 
upon the strategic interests of individual 
firms; Volkswagen accounts for 14% of 
Czech and 16% of Slovak exports in 
1999 (Pavlínek, 2004: 63, 65). IBM 
likewise controls a significant share of 
Hungarian exports.41 
The Hungarian National Develop-
ment Plan, published as part of its ap-
plication for EU SCF’s for the calendar 
period 2004–2006, outlines Hungarian 
concerns about declining levels of foreign 
direct investment and focuses attention 
on this shift in investment promotion 
strategies:  
“Hungary’s investment attracting ca-
pabilities have recently declined in 
parallel with an increase in labour 
costs and more intensive competition 
from low cost economies. This calls 
for a shift in investment promotion 
policy: the objective now is to sup-
port the attraction and retention of 
activities representing a high added 
                                                 
40 There is a long list of firms that have picked 
up stakes to invest in other regions: IBM (previ-
ously the largest exporter and importer in Hun-
gary), Marc Shoe, Mannesmann, one of their 
suppliers (Shinwa), Solectron and Flextronics 
(Szanyi, 2003?: 14; Pavlínek, 2004: 55–6). Hun-
gary is no exception. Similar stories are re-
counted about production in the Czech Republic: 
the German firm Varta Aku, the Belgian Massive 
Production and the Japanese–German Takta Petri, 
typically as a result of wage considerations (Pav-
línek, 2004: 56). 
41 In March 2005, IBM announced that it would 
undertake investments of $35.5 million in Hun-
gary and between 2003 and 2008 would under-
take further investments eventually employing 
some 17,000 workers (www.nol.hu: “IBM: 6,5 
milliárdos beruházás, 700 munkahely” IBM: 6.5 
billion Forint Investment, 700 jobs, March 3, 
2005). 
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value and promote their embedding 
into the Hungarian economy.” (Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2003: 204) 
On the other hand, data published by 
the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe illustrates that real gross 
fixed capital formation in Hungary has 
continuously risen between 1995 and 
2002.42 Thus although FDI inflows in the 
Hungarian economy have potentially 
reached a degree of saturation, total in-
vestment in the Hungarian economy ap-
pears to be on the rise. In this regard, 
Hungary is even a bit of an outlier, 
since the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithua-
nia, and Romania all experienced short-
term dips in 1999 (and for Latvia in 
both 1999 and 2000).43 
3) THE EU POLICY 
FRAMEWORK AND THE 
NMS’S 
Whether the supranational EU policy 
framework is compatible with CEE com-
petitiveness and economic development 
concerns motivates what follows. Several 
elements of the EU policy framework 
target the problem of competitiveness 
and economic development and are of 
potential interest to the CEEC’s. In the 
context of the Eastern Enlargement, at 
least three areas are highly salient. The 
future distribution of SCF’s, the potential 
harmonization of corporate tax rates and 
the role of state aids and competition 
policy are likely to dominate political and 
intellectual debate in the New Europe in 
the coming years. These three areas ex-
hibit strong potential for diverging inter-
ests with respect to economic competi-
tiveness and development. 
                                                 
42 See the Economic Survey of Europe, (2004, 
No. 1: 191, Appendix Table B.3). 
43 Ibid. 
Current discussions of EU Struc-
tural and Cohesion Fund reform already 
provide an indication of the potential 
divergence of interests in the New 
Europe. The so-called Sapir Report 
(European Commission, 2003) – intended 
to provide proposals on future reforms 
of the SCF’s – emerged with the broad 
recommendation that funding be re-
nationalized. This initiative has received 
some support from the OMS’s.44 Re-
nationalization is likely to be more 
strongly supported by “net contributors” 
to the EU budget (in particular Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and the 
UK). On the other hand, the NMS’s have 
strong incentives to insist on maintaining 
or even increasing the amplitude of the 
EU’s SCF’s. In this policy area, some ef-
fort has already been put into studying 
both the interests of Old and New 
Member states and the potential leeway 
for raising the amount of money avail-
able for these funds.45 
The willingness of Western, net-
contributor or more advanced states to 
dedicate significant resources to policies 
of Economic and Social Cohesion is ques-
tionable. The amounts set aside in the 
Commission’s proposal for the financial 
perspective 2007-201346 provide only mi-
nor increases over previous amounts (see 
Table 1 below). Between 2006 and 2007, 
spending will increase by 10% when Bul-
garia and Romania join, but by much 
smaller amounts in following years. Seen 
in per-capita terms, the amounts set 
aside for SCF spending remain almost 
constant between 2006 and 2007, rising 
from 0.26 to 0.27 Euros per person. 
Inflation is likely to wipe out the small 
increments between 2007 and 2013. 
These spending amounts are startling in 
the context of the Commission’s Third 
                                                 
44 See for example Tarschys (2003). 
45 See for example the report published by the 
Hungarian Institute for World Economics (Szem-
lér, 2004). 
46 See “Building our Common Future: Financial 
and Political Outlook for the Enlarged Union 
2007–2013”, (COM(2004) 101 final). 
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Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. 
This report notes a doubling in the EU 
population living below 75% of the EU 
average per capita GDP in 2007.47 De-
spite no mention of re-nationalization in 
the report, dedicated spending amounts 
may represent a trend in that direction. 
The CEEC’s will be required to pick up 
a far greater share of the economic re-
structuring and membership tab than 
former cohesion countries. 
Debates over corporate taxation 
exhibit a similarly strong insistence on 
national interests. Wrangling over the 
future of EU tax harmonization was ini-
tiated by Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder in March of 2004, two months 
prior to the official enlargement date. 
Though many states profess a strong in-
terest in corporate taxation policy, Ger-
many (with the support of France and 
other countries) led the charge against 
the comparatively low corporate tax 
rates offered in the CEEC’s. Schröder 
even complained of “fiscal dumping”, 
noting that these countries have average 
corporate tax rates below 20%, while the 
West European average hovers around 
31-32%. Several states including Germany 
and Sweden noted that low corporate 
tax rates in CEE are being financed by 
                                                 
47 European Commission (2004a: ix–x).  
EU funding.48 Together, 
France and Germany – oc-
casionally joined by Poland 
– launched an attempt to 
introduce a minimum rate 
of corporate taxation in 
Europe.49 On September 6th, 
2004, France’s Finance 
Minister Nicholas Sarkozy 
explicitly attempted to link 
SCF spending to compliance 
with a future EU-regulated 
minimum level of corporate 
taxation.50 Poland as well 
as the broader range of 
CEEC’s were opposed to 
this effort.51 
Corporate taxation is-
sues predate the member-
ship agreement (see e.g. Radaelli, 2001). 
Estonia’s “liberal” corporate tax regime 
was criticized by Romano Prodi as a po-
tential “problem” as early as March, 
2002. France, Italy and Spain were con-
cerned that Estonia’s corporate tax re-
gime constituted an “’unfair’ competitive 
advantage”.52 As the above noted exam-
ple of Hungary suggests, similar prob-
lems arose with other countries. Prior to 
the enlargement it was difficult to make 
any headway on harmonization. In re-
sponse to the Enlargement, several coun-
tries in Western Europe began to lower 
their corporate tax rates. In particular, 
effective January 1st, 2005, Austria low-
ered its corporate tax rate from 34% to 
24%.53 Germany likewise lowered its fed-
                                                 
48 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, 
“New EU States Use Low Tax Rates as Investment 
Bait” (4/25/2004). 
49 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, 
“Warsaw, Berlin and Paris Call for Harmonisa-
tion of EU Taxes” (7/22/2004). 
50 See e.g. Reuters.com: “Paris Idea to Link EU 
Funds, Tax Gets Cold Reception” (9/6/2004). 
51 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, 
“Poland Joins Outcry against French Proposal on 
EU Funds” (9/9/2004). 
52 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, 
“Commission Questions Estonia’s Liberal Corporate 
Tax Regime” (3/8/2002). 
53 See the website of the Federal Chancellary of 
Austria (http://www.austria.gv.at/). 
Table 1 
Proposed EU Expenditures on SCF’s 2006–2013 
 
 
Total Appro-
priations 
Percent 
Increase 
Estimated 
Population 
Per Capita Ap-
propriations 
2006 120,688,000   459,069,367 0.26 
2007 133,560,000 10.7% 489,194,290 0.27 
2008 138,700,000 3.8% 490,157,736 0.28 
2009 143,140,000 3.2% 491,125,055 0.29 
2010 146,670,000 2.5% 492,096,247 0.30 
2011 150,200,000 2.4% 493,071,313 0.30 
2012 154,315,000 2.7% 494,050,251 0.31 
2013 158,450,000 2.7% 495,033,061 0.32 
Source: Own calculations based on Appropriations data from 
“Building Our Common Future” (COM(2004) 101 final: p. 29) and 
population data from Eurostat Online NewCronos data 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos/reference/display.do?
screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=EU_general_statistics&depth=1&l
anguage=en) 
 22 
eral corporate tax rate from 40% for 
retained earnings, and 30% for distrib-
uted earnings to a flat rate of 25% in 
January, 2001.54 Moreover, Germany is 
currently considering a further reduction 
to 19%. However, given high local corpo-
rate tax rates, the effective corporate 
tax rate will remain much higher: 38.7% 
at the current rate and 32.7% at the 
suggested rate.55 
The enlargement may ultimately be 
successful in bringing corporate tax 
harmonization to the bargaining table. 
However, British and Irish resistance is 
significant. The UK, in particular, is re-
sponsible for retaining the right to a na-
tional veto on taxation issues in the new 
Constitutional Treaty.56 Moreover, the UK 
– as made clear by Gordon Brown, Brit-
ish Chancellor of the Exchequer – ap-
pears steadfastly opposed to any move in 
the direction of tax harmonization.57 Ire-
land – currently sporting 
the lowest corporate tax 
rate in Europe – likewise 
has every reason to con-
tinue to oppose harmoni-
zation. Given that most of 
the CEEC’s are opposed to 
such a move and given 
that such decisions – now 
or in the future under 
Constitutional Treaty – 
will require unanimity, 
corporate tax rates are 
not likely to be harmo-
nized any time soon. This 
does not preclude the 
                                                 
54 See the information website of the German 
government: http://www.germany-info.org/-
relaunch/business/taxes/german_tax_rates.html. 
55 See The Economist: “Taxing Times”, March 21, 
2005. 
56 Approved by the European Council in June 
2004, the Constitutional Treaty must further be 
ratified by each of the Member States, a process 
that could take up to two years from the origi-
nal date of passage. 
57 See for example: http://www.eubusiness.com, 
“Chancellor Schroeder Slams ‘Fiscal Dumping’ by 
New EU States” (4/29/2004), and “EU Embroiled 
in Taxing Debate Over ‘Fiscal Dumping’” 
(9/11/2004). 
possibility that some of the OMS’s most 
concerned about the consequences of 
corporate tax competition in the New 
Europe might attempt to link this issue 
to others (in particular the SCF’s) and 
either pressure the NMS’s into compli-
ance or lobby for the gradual phasing 
out of the SCF’s. 
Whether harmonization is justified 
on the basis of variation in rates of cor-
porate taxation across countries is more 
problematic.58 These difficulties aside, 
based on statutory rates of corporate 
taxation, there is little evidence that the 
EU genuinely needs to engage in har-
monization. Table 2 below provides some 
preliminary data on corporate tax rates 
across countries and on regional aver-
ages of corporate taxation across the 
New and Old Europe and the CEEC’s. 
Significant differences in unweighted av-
erage rates are apparent between the 
                                                 
58 Determining actual levels of corporate taxation 
across countries is complicated. Statutory rates 
are readily available, but these rates differ from 
those firms actually pay for several reasons. 
Countries have very different rules and taxation 
rates based on anything from how firms are 
allowed to calculate and deduct the depreciation 
of physical capital, to the rate at which retained 
and distributed earnings are taxed, to the role 
of various deductions available for region-specific 
investments and other investment incentive pro-
grams. So-called “effective” rates of corporate 
taxation thus differ from “statutory” rates. At-
tempts have been made to measure these differ-
ent rates of corporate taxation. See for example 
the work of Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). 
Table 2
Average Corporate Tax Rates in Europe 
 
 
Unweighted 
Averages 
(2003-2004)
Unweighted 
Averages 
(Future?) 
Weighted 
Averages 
(2003-2004) 
Weighted 
Averages 
(Future?) 
EU15 29.4% 29.4% 30.1% 30.1% 
CEEC10 21.5% 18.9% 21.4% 20.5% 
EU27 25.9% 24.7% 28.3% 28.1% 
Sources: Based on own calculations from Eurostat website popula-
tion data. Corporate taxation data was taken from the 2003 
Devereux, Griffith and Klemm dataset (for OMS’s), and from 
Ernst and Young (2003). Corporate tax rates for Germany were 
modified based on data from the German government’s informa-
tion website (http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/business/taxes-
/german_tax_rates.html) 
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OMS’s and the CEEC’s (29.4% and either 
21.5% or 18.9% respectively based on 
current and projected rates). The un-
weighted average across the New Europe 
is not as low, but exhibits a potentially 
significant drop from the previous aver-
age rate of corporate taxation (29.4% 
and either 25.9% or 24.7% respectively 
based on current and projected rates of 
corporate taxation). 
A strong case can be made for us-
ing weighted average corporate tax rates 
based on relative population sizes. Even 
though some countries have quite low 
rates of corporate taxation, the relative 
size of the employable population (and 
to a lesser extent the relative purchasing 
power)59 provides an upper limit on the 
potential to take advantage of this varia-
tion. The differences in the weighted av-
erages across the Old Europe and the 
CEEC’s remain large (30.1% and 21.4% 
respectively). But the differences across 
the Old and the New Europe are far 
less substantial (30.1% and 28.3% or 
28.1% respectively based on current and 
projected rates of corporate taxation). In 
this second case, the change in the aver-
age rate of corporate taxation across the 
Old and New Europe is at most 2%. 
Moreover, the CEEC’s have raised their 
effective rates in recent years due to the 
requirements of EU competition policy. 
Given these calculations it is difficult to 
comprehend the zeal with which the 
OMS’s have pursued this issue.  
Data on the FDI behaviour of the 
OMS’s, Japan and the US (see Table 3) 
suggests that capital has not been mov-
ing at any great pace toward CEE. 
While a few countries exhibit a shift in 
their regional FDI strategies – pro-
nounced for Austria but far more mod-
erate for Germany – the remaining 
Western states typically only exhibit a 
mild shift in their investment behaviour 
                                                 
59 Since a significant share of foreign investment 
is for the purpose of exports, no attempt is 
made in this analysis to control for relative pur-
chasing power. 
toward CEE. The majority of OMS’s have 
CEE investment shares well below 5% of 
their investment shares in the former 
“European core” (here defined as the set 
of more advanced OMS’s, excluding the 
cohesion countries Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain). 
In 1999, France’s CEE FDI, for ex-
ample, only amounts to 4.1% of its 
European core investments. On the other 
hand, Germany’s CEE investment share 
represents a good 10.3% of its European 
core investments in the same year. 
Oddly, Austria, though so far not a 
party to the complaints of France, Ger-
many and Sweden, has witnessed very 
high rates of investment in CEE. Though 
these investments may have reached their 
highpoint in 1997 (72.6% of their in-
vestments in the European core), they 
still amounted to 62.1% of investments in 
the European core in 1999. Greece as 
well remains an outlier with CEE invest-
ments almost equalling investments in the 
European core in 1998. But these in-
vestments drop off precipitously by the 
year 2000. Moreover, in recent years a 
reversal of these trends may be emerg-
ing. As noted above, although Hungarian 
FDI rose again substantially in 2004, 
Hungary and other CEEC’s have begun 
to experience declining rates of FDI. Fi-
nally, even with investment promotion 
incentives and low rates of corporate 
taxation, FDI outflows from CEE have 
risen steadily over the years. This last 
point is difficult to explain in the context 
of Western concerns.60 
On the other hand, looking at data 
on the shift in Old Member States, Japa-
nese and US FDI behaviour in the for-
mer cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) (See Table 4), much 
of the investment in CEE may well occur 
at the expense of the former cohesion
                                                 
60 According to data from the website of the 
Hungarian National Bank, for example, total 
stocks of outward FDI have risen from 216.9 
million Euros in 1995 to 2,566 million Euros in 
2003. 
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Table 3 
Share of CEEC FDI Relative to FDI in the European Core 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Austria 6.2% 16.5% 26.4% 43.5% 55.3% 72.5% 63.9% 65.5% 72.6% 59.8% 62.1%  
Belgium/Luxembourg 0.1% -0.1% 2.8% 0.6% 11.5% 0.2% 2.9% 9.2% 8.1% 6.9% 4.6% 1.0% 
Denmark   0.5%   2.2%    6.9%   
Finland    0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.9% 1.7% 1.5% 1.2% 3.5%  
France -0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 1.8% 2.3% 3.3% 3.0% 4.1%  
Germany 0.1% 0.3% 1.0% 2.3% 3.8% 5.0% 6.2% 7.6% 9.1% 11.5% 10.3%  
Greece          98.5% 77.0% 47.1% 
Ireland             
Italy 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 1.1% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Netherlands 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.6% 2.1% 4.1% 4.7% 5.6% 6.1%  
Portugal       0.3% 0.4% 1.4% 2.8% 24.0% 13.5% 
Spain 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.5% 4.5% 3.2% 3.9% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 8.2% 
Sweden  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.9% 2.2% 2.9% 3.8% 
UK 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 1.7% 2.3% 1.8%  
             
Norway 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4%   
Switzerland     0.8% 1.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.9% 3.4%  
             
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
USA 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (2001). 
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Table 4 
Share of CEEC FDI Relative to FDI in the Old Cohesion Countries 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Austria 192.0% 376.4% 424.2% 909.3% 666.1% 785.3% 906.5% 909.0% 858.0% 954.0% 1016.5%  
Belgium/Luxembourg 1.6% -1.0% 91.6% 2.9% 86.6% -0.8% 18.3% 20.2% 171.2% 24.1% 96.8% 26.3% 
Denmark   4.3%   17.2%    84.6%   
Finland    0.0% 0.0% 23.5% 23.2% 39.3% 36.0% 44.5% 208.9%  
France -1.8% -0.1% 0.8% 2.5% 4.3% 4.8% 10.8% 13.9% 16.5% 19.8% 37.1%  
Germany 0.6% 1.5% 3.8% 9.4% 16.8% 23.1% 31.4% 41.6% 51.3% 67.6% 74.0%  
Greece          16031.6% 7653.0% 5168.8% 
Ireland             
Italy 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 2.5% 12.0% 12.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  
Netherlands 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.2% 13.5% 15.8% 28.0% 31.6% 33.3% 37.4%  
Portugal       0.2% 0.2% 0.9% 2.1% 6.5% 5.2% 
Spain 0.0% 0.4% 0.5% 1.3% 3.3% 7.9% 43.2% 4.8% 3.3% 5.5% 753.1% 60.5% 
Sweden    0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.7% 19.4% 21.6% 31.0% 38.1% 
UK 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 1.5% 1.3% 4.2% 3.9% 5.2% 13.2% 15.7% 15.0%  
             
Norway 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 9.0% 17.2% 18.3% 15.9% 18.6% 23.1% 29.8%   
Switzerland     9.7% 12.3% 22.2% 19.0% 17.0% 27.3% 21.6%  
             
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.5% 7.4% 7.4%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
USA 0.0% 0.8% 1.4% 2.5% 9.5% 13.1% 14.7% 14.5% 13.0% 10.8% 10.1% 9.6% 
 192.0% 376.4% 424.2% 909.3% 666.1% 785.3% 906.5% 909.0% 858.0% 954.0% 1016.5%  
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics (2001). 
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countries. The relative share of invest-
ment in CEE has risen rapidly for Aus-
tria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the 
UK, Norway, Switzerland and the US. 
Though this pattern is not typically ac-
companied by a decline in the absolute 
FDI figures in the former cohesion coun-
tries, in the absence of the fall of the 
East Bloc a share of CEE investment 
might well have gone to the former co-
hesion countries. This provides strong 
motivation both for Spain’s participation 
in this agenda and the insistence of the 
former cohesion countries on their con-
tinued receipt of EU structural and cohe-
sion funding, suggesting that these coun-
tries are likely to continue lobbying in-
tensively. 
The European Commission has thus 
far resisted attempts to move toward 
corporate tax harmonization and has re-
jected the Sarkozy proposals. For one, 
Günter Verheugen, new competition min-
ister in 2004 noted that barring low tax 
states from receiving SCF’s in the manner 
suggested by Sarkozy is virtually impos-
sible given existing rules for their distri-
bution.61 During the hearings for new 
Commissioners before the European Par-
liament during the fall of 2004, Ver-
heugen argued that tax competition 
“could be useful” and that the presence 
of lower tax rates in some states does 
“not necessarily lead to delocalization”.62 
The third policy area likely to 
dominate future discussion in the New 
Europe is competition policy and the role 
of state aids. This policy area is linked 
to the issue of rates of corporate taxa-
tion. As noted above, several of the 
NMS’s were required to substantially 
modify generous tax holidays and other 
                                                 
61 See www.euractiv.com (10/4/2004), “Ver-
heugen calls Sarkozy’s Corporate Tax Ideas ‘Un-
realistic’”. 
62 Ibid. See also Verheugen’s statements before 
the EP Committee on Industry, Research and En-
ergy (EP New Report, 9/30/2004). 
investment promotion schemes.63 Ulti-
mately, the EU viewed these methods of 
promoting FDI as state aids and Hun-
gary and other countries were required 
to dismantle or modify them. 
Current EU approaches to state aid 
and the promotion of competitiveness 
have been influenced both by anti-statist 
and state interventionist traditions.64 On 
the anti-statist side, EU policy has 
gradually begun to favour greater com-
petition in areas previously considered 
the preeminent domain of the state (e.g. 
telecommunications, railways, energy). 
Free-market entry and open and com-
petitive public procurement policies per-
vade current practice in the regulation 
of the provision of services.65 And while 
privatization is not specifically a re-
quirement of EU law, the EU does pro-
tect and promote both free competition 
with public sector utilities (such as state-
owned telecommunications and postal 
services), and EU competition policy re-
quires that public firms not make use of 
state resources in order to compete with 
private sector firms (Martin, 1999: 5). 
Likewise, the neo-liberal logic appears to 
pervade the shift away from providing 
government support to individual eco-
nomic sectors, in particular, coal, steel, 
textiles and the clothing sector. The 
European Coal and Steel Community, for 
example, was formally abandoned in 
2002. 
On the state interventionist side, EU 
state aid and industrial policy has begun 
a gradual shift toward more neutral 
forms of state intervention. EU state aid 
policy emphasizes “horizontal” state aid 
measures and eschews sectoral or what I 
refer to as “vertical” state aids. Horizon-
                                                 
63 The EU even used the early “European” or 
“Association Agreements” as a means to try and 
reduce the level of state subsidies in CEE. 
64 Behrens and Smyrl (1999) note that EU policy 
is driven by competing and contradictory para-
digms. 
65 Since the late 80’s, the EU has pursued direc-
tives on open public procurement and the re-
quirement of open EU-wide bidding on the provi-
sion of public services. 
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tal state aids are focused on broadly 
applicable principles of economic devel-
opment (human capital development, in-
frastructure, R&D) and are thus poten-
tially useful to a broad range of eco-
nomic sectors. Sectoral or vertical state 
aids ultimately help to prop up declining 
economic sectors and/or firms (e.g. the 
steel, clothing and textile sectors in 
Western Europe).66 Moreover, across the 
EU as a whole, some 51% of EU member 
state aid still goes to the manufacturing 
sector, suggesting that states themselves 
are unwilling to completely relinquish 
more vertically oriented interventionist 
traditions (European Commission, 2004b: 
13).  
The EU, however, has not dispensed 
with more vertical forms of government 
intervention. The EU continues to permit 
extensive government intervention in at 
least two sectors: agriculture and rail-
ways. Although the shift to horizontal 
measures has typically not affected agri-
cultural policy in the EU, a general 
though excessively gradual trend towards 
the elimination of direct agricultural 
supports has emerged with particular the 
June 2003 reform of the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy. This reform intro-
duces a gradual shift from direct farm 
payments to support for rural develop-
ment. The railway sector remains the 
second sector in which the EU continues 
to allow extensive public intervention. 
Moreover, while aid to the railway sec-
tor is typically detailed in the European 
Commission’s State Aid Scoreboards, it is 
still considered a separate category not 
subject to state aid restrictions. 
For another, regional policy goals 
remain a significant portion of the EU 
budget. Whether this policy area should 
                                                 
66 For an excellent overview of these different 
state aid measures, see Martin (1999). The Euro-
pean Commission first announced the shift to-
ward horizontal measures in 1994 with the pub-
lication of its report on “An Industrial Competi-
tiveness Policy for the EU” (COM(94) 319 final). 
This initiative has gained considerable momentum 
with the Lisbon Agenda announced at the 2000 
Lisbon Summit. 
be considered vertical or horizontal in 
character is problematic. Within the 
framework of the EU’s regulations on 
state aid, states are permitted to engage 
in national projects of regional develop-
ment. And the Commission’s State Aid 
Scoreboard classifies regional aid as 
“horizontal”, suggesting such aid is in 
line with the shift to more broadly-based 
objectives. However, regional state aid 
can still end up in the hands of firms 
and investors. Moreover, whereas at the 
national level aid can be distributed us-
ing broad neutral criteria that do not 
favour individual firms, given the scale 
of regional and local development strate-
gies, projects are more likely to target 
individual firms.67 In 2002, some 31.5% 
of EU horizontal aid was defined as “re-
gional” state aid (European Commission, 
2004b: 20). Presumably SCF’s should be 
classified in a similar category.  
The EU’s most recent attempt at 
promoting economic competitiveness – the 
so-called Lisbon Agenda – places a 
strong emphasis on horizontal measures 
and the promotion of broadly-based EU 
and national-level research and develop-
ment goals. In particular, as noted also 
in the EU’s various State Aid Scoreboards 
(see e.g. European Commission, 2004b, 
2004c), the Lisbon Agenda explicitly 
represents a formal attempt to broaden 
the scope of state intervention by rec-
ommending that states shift “public ex-
penditure towards growth-enhancing in-
vestment in physical and human capital 
and knowledge subject to overall budget 
constraints” (European Commission, 
2004c: 21). 
Whether horizontal measures are 
well suited to solving the economic de-
velopment and restructuring problems of 
                                                 
67 While there are general limitations on the so-
called “intensity” of aid – i.e. the total amount 
of benefit individual recipients are eligible to re-
ceive relative to the investment made (e.g. tax 
exemptions can only refund up to some precise 
percentage of the original investment) – there are 
no real limitations on which firms can receive 
aid. 
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the CEEC’s, or whether more vertical 
policy approaches are necessary in order 
to achieve improvements in economic 
competitiveness should perhaps be at the 
core of debates in the New Europe. The 
EU’s State Aid Scoreboard provides an 
interesting perspective on potential future 
policy divergence across the more and 
less developed economies of Europe. A 
small group of countries stand out as 
having made the smallest transition to-
ward horizontal state aid initiatives over 
the period 1998–2002 (See Figure 1). 
The four countries with the highest share 
of vertical state aid are Portugal, Ire-
land, Spain and France – ranging from 
some 26-58%. In contrast, at least eight 
EU member states distribute more than 
90% of state aid through horizontal state 
aid measures, while 2 further states 
(Sweden and the UK) distribute signifi-
cantly large shares of horizontal state 
aid. Only two of the more advanced EU 
member states – France and Germany – 
still distribute significantly large shares of 
aid through vertical measures. While 
Greece appears to be an outlier and dis-
tributes surprisingly few resources 
through vertical measures, 74% of Greek 
state aid is for regional development, the 
highest share of any single EU member 
state (European Commission, 2004b: 14, 
20).68 
In CEE there is a far greater em-
phasis on vertical state aid measures. As 
noted above, in Hungary horizontal 
measures accounted only for 8.2% and 
9.3% of state aids in 1999 and 2000 
respectively.69 The autumn 2004 update 
of the State Aid Scoreboard includes 
data on state aid expenditure in CEE 
over the period 2000–2003. According 
to this report, the findings for Hungary 
are generally consistent with findings for 
the broad range of CEEC’s. On average, 
the NMS’s spent some 78% of state aids 
on vertical measures. Estonia is the only 
significant outlier, with 100% of state aid 
spent on horizontal measures. As with 
Greece, some of this aid is for regional 
development (33%, the largest single 
category in Estonia). A significant share 
of state aid in Estonia is nonetheless 
spent on more typically horizontal meas-
ures. However, Estonia’s investment pro-
motion strategy (described in more detail 
below) is not classified as “state aid” 
and thus is not picked up by these sta-
tistics. Apart from Estonia, all of the 
CEEC’s still have significant vertical state 
                                                 
68 Luxembourg is next in line with 61% of state 
aid going to regional development, then Belgium 
with 52%. (ibid: 20). 
69 All data on Hungarian state aids is derived 
from the Annual Survey of Hungary on State Aid 
Falling Under Article 62 of the Europe Agree-
ment 1996-2000, State Aid Monitoring Office 
(2002: 17, 35, 37). 
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aid expenditures (European Commission, 
2004c: 21). 
The typical form of aid for indi-
vidual countries is tax exemptions. Apart 
from Cyprus (80.9%) and Malta (36.6%), 
Hungary (61.5%), Latvia (57.1%), Poland 
(34.5%) and Slovakia (72.4%) provide the 
dominant share of state aid through tax 
exemptions. Estonia, Lithuania and Slove-
nia, on the other hand, provide most of 
their state aid through direct grants. 
While the Czech Republic has provided 
most of its aid through guarantees, this 
is primarily explained by government 
bailouts in the Czech banking sector 
(European Commission, 2004c: 25). 
4) OF SQUARE PEGS, ROUND 
HOLES AND BARGAINING 
HURDLES  
Returning to the previous distinction be-
tween economic growth and economic 
development, the most pressing question 
is whether the EU policy framework is 
suitable to sustainable long-term eco-
nomic development in CEE. This remains 
an open question. As noted above, most 
of the previous measures employed to 
promote investment in Hungary, for ex-
ample, were classified as state aids dur-
ing the accession negotiations. As a re-
sult, these measures have now either 
been eliminated or modified into regional 
measures compatible with the EU policy 
framework. While on the one hand it is 
often seen as advantageous for the 
CEEC’s to adopt EU policy approaches, 
this needs more thorough debate, both in 
the context of competitiveness strategies 
and more generally. The following dis-
cussion analyzes the impact of EU mem-
bership and adopting the EU policy 
framework on the potential for CEEC’s to 
pursue the objectives of economic growth 
and long-term, sustained economic devel-
opment. 
While Hungary (Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and perhaps even Po-
land and Slovakia) may be well along 
the road to sustained economic recovery, 
many of the other countries in CEE have 
been less fortunate in their attempts to 
attract foreign direct investment and/or 
have introduced less extensive investment 
promotion schemes. When FDI stocks are 
measured as a share of GDP, in order 
of magnitude, Estonia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary and Slovakia appear to be 
the winners in the process of attracting 
foreign investment (Hunya, 2004: 96). 
Measured in per capita terms, FDI 
stocks are greatest in Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland 
(Sass does not provide data on Estonia) 
(Sass, 2003: 14). Investment promotion 
incentives appear to play a strong role. 
As noted in the State Aid Scoreboard, 
over the period 2000–2003 86% of the 
total state aid in CEE was spent by 3 
countries; Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary (European Commission, 
2004c: 5). Likewise, as noted above and 
in order of magnitude, Slovakia (72.4%), 
Hungary (61.5%), Latvia (57.1%) and Po-
land (34.5%) granted the largest shares 
of state aid through tax exemptions (the 
category that covers investment promo-
tion schemes qualifying as state aid un-
der the EU regulatory framework). While 
Estonia first appears as an outlier, the 
investment promotion schemes adopted 
were not classified as state aid. Even 
though countries such as the Czech Re-
public, Poland or Slovakia have had a 
much smaller window of opportunity to 
pursue such schemes, they appear to 
have been able to use them to their ad-
vantage. 
At least some elements of the evolv-
ing EU policy framework are likely to be 
marginally compatible with the interests 
of the more advanced CEEC’s. The cur-
rent shift in emphasis in Hungary from 
the simple attraction of foreign direct 
investment to more diverse forms of in-
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vestment promotion – in particular the 
Smart Hungary program’s promotion of 
R&D activities or the promotion of Coop-
eration Research Centers – are programs 
broadly compatible with horizontal EU 
policy objectives. In this regard, Hun-
gary, along with Estonia and Slovenia, 
has clearly begun to shift more of its 
state aid to horizontal measures (Euro-
pean Commission, 2004c: 21).  
However, several potential problems 
emerge with the compatibility of the EU 
policy framework. The Lisbon Agenda’s 
promotion of broad-based horizontal pol-
icy initiatives is primarily based on rais-
ing national-level expenditures and/or re-
directing EU-level expenditures.70 In this 
regard, the Lisbon Agenda is potentially 
part of a redistributional re-
nationalization plan. Most of the Lisbon 
Agenda – perceived as the new potential 
engine of economic growth and devel-
opment within the EU – is focused pri-
marily on state-level expenditures. In or-
der to promote the knowledge-based 
economy, states are urged to increase 
their overall R&D expenditures to 3% of 
GDP by 2010. Two thirds of this expen-
diture is expected to come from the pri-
vate sector.71 Discussion of EU spending 
on the Lisbon Agenda is further firmly 
rooted in the context of movement away 
from vertical forms of state aid.72 As 
such, this policy approach provides a 
venue for arguing against the logic of 
current forms of EU-level funding. 
Moreover, the required levels of domestic 
R&D expenditure are likely to be diffi-
                                                 
70 Rather than attempt to find new ways of 
shifting EU expenditure to such broad categories, 
the Council of Ministers’ response to the Lisbon 
Agenda instead recommended that the Commis-
sion focus its efforts on re-directing expenditures 
and that states try to find the resources for such 
expenditures within existing budgetary limitations 
(“Final Report on the European Action for 
Growth”, Council of the EU, November 26, 2003: 
7–9). 
71 See for example “Investing in Research: An 
Action Plan for Europe”, COM(2003) 226 fi-
nal/2. 
72 Ibid: 19. 
cult for the CEEC’s to achieve given cur-
rent budgetary pressures. 
Whether or not the EU’s regional 
development policy and state aid frame-
work ultimately provides enough flexibil-
ity to continue promoting sufficient levels 
of investment is likewise questionable. 
The regional aid-intensity maps agreed 
with the European Commission set pre-
cise limits on the share of nationally 
funded state aid. In Hungary, investment 
promotion incentives can now refund be-
tween 35% and 50% of the original in-
vestment. Comparable aid-intensity levels 
apply for the other CEEC’s.73 However, 
the previous aid intensities granted to 
individual investing firms in the pre-
accession phase often exceeded these lev-
els. Mutti and Grubert (2004) argue that 
multinational corporations producing for 
export rather than domestic markets are 
more and more sensitive to host country 
taxation. To the extent this is true, this 
modification of CEE investment promotion 
schemes may significantly impact on re-
gional FDI flows. 
Two further observations likewise 
serve to illustrate problems concerning 
reliance on the EU’s regional development 
tool. For one, the allowable aid-intensities 
for tax exemptions or grants are much 
lower in regions that have attracted the 
highest levels of FDI. Shifting investment 
and economic development to those re-
gions that have thus far attracted less of 
it is potentially positive. But this may not 
augur well in conjunction with seemingly 
natural economic tendencies to “cluster” 
investment in regions with previously ex-
isting concentrations of economic activity 
(Martin, 2003). In this respect, investors 
                                                 
73 Most of Hungary qualifies for the maximum 
aid intensity of 50%, but the metropolitan area 
of Budapest only qualifies for an aid intensity of 
35%, while the larger Pest County surrounding 
Budapest qualifies for 40%. Two Western coun-
ties in Hungary qualify for 45%. For more in-
formation, see the EU’s aid intensity maps for the 
NMS’s at the website of the Directorate General 
for Competition: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/re
gional/2004/. 
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may simply choose to go elsewhere, 
making it difficult to capitalize on the 
last decade of economic restructuring 
and foreign investment flows. Moreover, 
investors may be more likely to avoid 
less developed regions to the extent that 
infrastructure and human capital remains 
underdeveloped. In this regard, the lack 
of significant SCF’s to support the build-
ing of infrastructure and human capital 
potential in underdeveloped regions may 
further hamstring the success of regional 
development measures. 
This is potentially most problematic 
where countries would like to continue 
to target specific industries (such as the 
automotive and electrical engineering sec-
tors) or types of economic activity (in 
particular R&D) in order to further re-
fine the process of economic develop-
ment. Thus, for example, Hungary’s at-
tempts to focus on the sustainable and 
embedded development of the automotive 
and electrical engineering sectors might 
potentially be one of the early casualties 
of integration in the EU policy frame-
work.74 Despite the fact that the Lisbon 
Agenda promotes the use of “private 
sector” resources, capital scarcity and 
the difficulties of CEE domestic firms in 
raising capital expenditures and re-
sources greatly limits this potential. In 
this regard, CEE governments find them-
selves compelled to fill the gap between 
the lack of private sector resources and 
their development interests, but are like-
wise constrained by the combination of 
EU restrictions on aid intensity and EMU 
convergence criteria. 
The remaining CEEC’s – Latvia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania – have 
had virtually no opportunity to introduce 
significant investment promotion mecha-
nisms. Far less successful at attracting 
significant amounts of FDI – in particu-
lar due to their inability to introduce 
                                                 
74 One response to this in Hungary may be to 
fund projects from national level expenditure, 
but at relatively low levels, so that expenditures 
do not contravene EU state-aid restrictions (Inter-
view with Magdolna Sass, March 24th, 2005). 
successful market reforms or promote 
political stability – the slow process of 
transition has produced a lag that may 
be more difficult to overcome once in-
side the EU. As EU members, these coun-
tries may have a more difficult time ini-
tiating similar investment promotion 
schemes and attracting comparable 
amounts of FDI. In this regard, all of 
the above observations raise significant 
questions about the CEE ability to inte-
grate seamlessly into the EU policy 
framework. 
A number of potential criticisms 
can or have been levied at these invest-
ment promotion strategies. For one, the 
crafting of investment promotion schemes 
varies considerably across countries. 
Variation in their form and shape may 
provide insight into their advantages and 
disadvantages. In the Hungarian context, 
while the investment promotion incentives 
were strongly geared toward attracting 
large initial investments, there were no 
strong incentives offered to encourage 
large firms to continue investing. Once 
firms made an initial investment they 
could benefit from the tax concession for 
10 years without undertaking further 
investments. In this regard, Estonia’s 
strategy provides a relevant comparison. 
Though Estonia’s overall rate of corpo-
rate taxation remains high in the CEEC 
context (currently 26% on the distribu-
tion of dividends), Estonia adopted a 0% 
corporate tax rate for re-invested profits. 
While this policy was criticized in the 
EU, it does not contravene existing EU 
policy and has not been declared incom-
patible with the EU acquis (Radaelli, 
2001).75 More importantly however, it 
                                                 
75 Current Estonian corporate taxation only con-
cerns the distribution of dividends to investors, 
gifts and non-business related expenses (see Esto-
nian Ministry of Finance: 
http://www.fin.ee/index.php?id=3830). The tax 
rate on distributed corporate profits is 26%. 
However, Estonia also abolished its tax on rein-
vested corporate profits in January, 2000 
(Hunya, 2004: 106). Finally, Estonia received a 
transition period that allows affiliates in Estonia 
to distribute profits to their parent companies at 
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has the potential advantage of encourag-
ing continued investments. 
Real tradeoffs likewise exist be-
tween government subsidized investment 
promotion schemes and the ability of 
governments to fund other policy areas. 
The budget for social welfare expendi-
ture in particular may have been con-
strained by such policies. Greskovits and 
Bohle (2003) note that Slovakia progres-
sively lowered its corporate tax rate 
from 40% to 29% in the year 2000, and 
then to 19% in 2004.76 As these authors 
make clear, the Slovakian government 
estimated that the changes in 2004 
would lead to a drop in government 
revenues of some 480 million Euros. In 
the long run, these authors link the 
2004 food riots in Eastern Slovakia to 
parallel reductions in unemployment 
benefits (2003: 23–5).  
Other costs of investment promotion 
are far more difficult to calculate. On 
the one hand, tax exemptions for large 
investments are not directly paid for out 
of the government budget and therefore 
do not necessarily reduce the existing 
budget. On the other hand, tax exemp-
tions represent potential losses in terms 
of government revenues. However, two 
caveats deserve attention. First, without 
such tax exemptions, the rate of foreign 
investment in Hungary and other coun-
tries might not have been as high. In 
order to calculate any loss in govern-
ment revenues, this point must be con-
sidered. Second, attempting to attract 
large investments may well have the im-
pact of creating significant sunk costs 
which foreign investors are then unlikely 
to uproot once tax incentive schemes 
have run their course. In this regard, 
                                                                          
a 0% tax rate until December 31, 2008 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2002: 35). 
76 Income and value-added tax rates (VAT) were 
also adjusted to one single flat rate of 19%. 
While this represented an increase in the VAT, it 
represented a significant reduction of income 
taxes. In order to compensate for the potential 
loss in government revenues, the VAT, excise 
duties and energy prices were raised (Greskovits 
and Bohle, 2003: 23–4). 
the important number of large-scale in-
vestments made in the Hungarian econ-
omy may provide a more solid future 
tax base, despite the potential for such 
firms to continue taking advantage of 
future tax schemes. 
Two further observations suggest 
that investment promotion schemes may 
have had significant payoffs for the av-
erage citizen in CEE. For one, though the 
evolution of income inequality across CEE 
is uneven,77 Hungary and the Czech Re-
public in both 1989 and 2001 remain 
well below the average level of income 
inequality in the OECD in the mid-
1990’s. Poland, Estonia and the other 
CEEC’s (Slovakia was not included in this 
measure) had however all risen above 
the OECD average by 2001 (UNECE, 
2004b: 165–6).78 For another, the evolu-
tion of real wages is generally favour-
able for countries that pursued invest-
ment promotion schemes. Only four of 
the CEEC’s were able to obtain wage 
levels at or above their 1989 level by 
2001: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary and Poland (though Slovakia lags 
on this measure, the big changes in gov-
ernment policy with respect to investment 
promotion occur in 2000 and most 
importantly in 2004) (UNECE, 2004b: 
167). These two measures suggest that 
governments were not only likely to 
secure future revenues, but citizens 
directly benefited as well. 
Another objection concerns the de-
gree of tax competition between the 
CEEC’s. While this may be a very real 
problem, this analysis may misconceive 
the real axis of competition over invest-
                                                 
77 Hellman likewise pointed out a correlation 
between lower levels of income inequality in CEE 
(despite overall rises in income inequality) in 
countries that had pursued more extensive re-
forms (1998: 224–5). 
78 A word of caution is necessary here. As both 
Hellman and the UNECE study point out, the 
former CIS states (apart from Belarus) all have 
much higher levels of income inequality. Only 
Estonia, the most “liberalized” of the CEEC’s, 
begins to rise above some of the lowest levels in 
the former CIS states (UNECE, 2004b: 166). 
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ment resources in Europe. To some ex-
tent, the CEEC’s are competing for in-
vestment with the more advanced Euro-
pean economies. While the CEE econo-
mies have very real advantages vis-à-vis 
investment locations such as Germany – 
a significant supply of skilled and com-
paratively cheap labour – they lack a 
number of other advantages present in 
the more advanced regions of Europe – 
highly developed infrastructures, a larger 
pool of highly-skilled labour, and long 
established centres focused on research, 
development and product innovation. As 
suggested by the data on FDI flows in 
Table 3 above, the advantages of CEE 
have not been great enough to signifi-
cantly reverse regional investment flows 
away from the European core. 
Finally, the problem of capture de-
serves attention.79 Clearly it is not always 
in the interest of governments to subsi-
dize firms. There were, however, signifi-
cant differences in the strategies pursued 
by Hungary and some of the other 
CEEC’s. Hungary’s approach was strongly 
focused on moving firms out of the 
sphere of state ownership. This strategy 
of large scale privatization was pursued 
earlier in Hungary than in the other CEE 
economies.80 Thus, as pointed out by 
Antalóczy and Sass, significant conces-
sions granted to foreign investors first 
assisted the state in the process of priva-
                                                 
79 The notion of “capture” is an important con-
cept in the literature on state intervention. Hell-
man in particular provides an interesting discus-
sion of the very real problems of capture in CEE 
economies, arguing that those countries that were 
more successful at introducing and then pursuing 
more thoroughgoing market reforms – largely 
due to greater democratic reforms – were also 
more successful at avoiding the costs of capture 
(1998). Vachudova further builds upon this con-
cept of the potential for capture and the impor-
tance of democratic reforms (2005). 
80 Though rapid privatization to foreign owners 
was in part inspired by the Hungarian level of 
foreign debt in the early years of transition, 
there was an added benefit of selling Hungarian 
firms to foreign investors. This strategy facilitated 
avoiding accusations of corruption (Mihályi, 
2001: 63–66). For a more comparative analysis 
of Central and East European privatization 
strategies, see Rojec (2004). 
tization (including even monopoly control 
and/or protected markets). Later, Hun-
garian FDI strategies focused on promot-
ing continued investment in Greenfield 
projects (Antalóczy and Sass, 2001: 44). 
In general, Hungarian investment promo-
tion schemes employed what I call “neu-
tral (performance) criteria” and were 
typically not directed at individual firms 
(though the early policies clearly fa-
voured foreign investors). These criteria 
were neutral in that any firm was eligi-
ble to receive tax exemptions from the 
government and they were often “per-
formance-based” in cases where export 
or output criteria were added to the cri-
teria for receiving tax exemptions. 
In contrast, some countries held on 
to large state enterprises and provided 
direct subsidies for longer periods of 
time than were presumably advisable. 
Poland, for example, pursued a con-
scious strategy of ‘commercializing’ of 
state-owned firms. While this strategy 
did not rule out the potential for future 
privatization, neither did it guarantee 
that all state-owned firms would ulti-
mately be transferred over to private 
ownership or offered for sale to foreign 
investors (Kolodko and Nuti, 1997: 26). 
The slow restructuring of the Polish steel 
sector cost the government considerable 
sums of money and weighed heavily on 
the state budget.81 According to Protocol 
No. 8 of the Accession Treaty, Poland 
had already spent some 62.360 million 
PLN (approx. $15.6 million) in restructur-
ing aid between 1997 and 2001.82 
Moreover, this figure may well under-
state the amount of real indirect gov-
ernment subsidies provided to PHS. Most 
                                                 
81 Accounting for approximately 70% of polish 
steel production, Polskie Huty Stali (PHS) was 
privatized in 2004. The agreement with LNM 
Holding included payments of $850 million to 
cover PHS debts and $600 million in guaranteed 
investments (PAP News Wire, 3/5/2004). The 
privatization agreement was spurred forward by 
demands from the European Commission that the 
Polish government stop providing state aid to the 
steel sector. 
82 Official Journal (9/23/2003: 948). 
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government subsidies to the Polish steel, 
coal-mining and railway sectors took the 
form of tax reductions and other debt 
write-offs. Moreover, record keeping on 
these subsidies often appears to conceal 
the major recipients (Sowa, 2003). Proto-
col No. 8 limited further restructuring 
expenditures to 3.078 billion PLN 
(approx. $770 million USD) in 2002 and 
2003, and no further aid was to be 
granted from that point on.83 Many of 
the CEEC’s provide numerous examples 
of the excessive costs of state ownership. 
At the same time, though many see 
the impact of EU pressure as positive,84 
it is difficult to ignore the negative role 
of Western interests in this case. In the 
late 1990’s, the Polish government gave 
in to EU attempts to limit production 
and reduce employment in the Polish 
steel sector thereby successfully dampen-
ing the impact of some of the more 
competitive Polish steel firms on the EU 
marketplace and labour structure. The 
polish government ultimately signed an 
agreement that traded EU funding for 
the restructuring Polish steel industry in 
return for Polish government control 
over the allocation of production quotas 
to Polish steel producers (Keat, 2000). 
As Keat argues, this agreement failed to 
reward firms in the Polish steel industry 
that had privatized and invested in new 
technologies, effectively reducing their 
ability to compete in the EU marketplace. 
Moreover, by distributing market shares, 
production quotas presumably impacted 
the ability of the Polish government to 
privatize the steel sector. 
Despite the greater degree of early 
privatization, Hungarian state-owned 
firms likewise represent a significant 
                                                 
83 Official Journal (9/23/2003: 948). A Polish 
government audit of the effects of state aid 
found that 9 out of 12 cases of aid to the Polish 
steel sector were “inefficient and ineffective” 
(Sowa, 2003: 28). 
84 Moravcsik and Vachudova, for example, refer 
to “blocked bailouts of uncompetitive firms” as 
one of the positive benefits of EU pressure (2003: 
47). 
drain on the budget and a number of 
firms remain in state ownership.85 The 
reintroduction of the holdings of the 
Hungarian National Development Bank 
(MFB) – one of the two agencies in 
Hungary responsible for managing the 
assets of state firms along with the 
Hungarian Privatization and Holding 
Company (APV Rt.) – back into the 
budget of the Hungarian national gov-
ernment in 2002 was one of the princi-
pal factors explaining the significant rise 
in the government’s budget deficit to 
9.3% of GDP that year.86 The rising gov-
ernment deficit was presumably also af-
fected by the inability of the government 
to use privatization revenues from the 
APV Rt. after January 2003. Previously, 
these funds were used to pay down the 
government debt and were not subject to 
parliamentary approval. Since January 
2003, however, privatization revenues 
                                                 
85 The APV Rt. still administrates some 99 or 
more state-owned firms. One example, MALÉV 
airlines – currently almost 100% owned by the 
Hungarian government – has for many years 
been a loss-making state enterprise (though pre-
viously partially privatized and part-owned by 
Alitalia). China’s Hainan Airlines considered mak-
ing a bid for MALÉV in the summer 2004, but 
the deal was later dropped. In early 2004, 
MALÉV had an accumulated debt of 36.4 billion 
Forint (or about 181 million US Dollars) and was 
running a deficit in the first half of 2004 of 3.9 
billion Forint (about 19.5 million US Dollars). See 
for example: http://english.budapest.hu, “MALEV 
Hopes to Break Even” (9/16/2004). Though most 
of the Hungarian electricity sector is now fully 
privatized, MVM, the Hungarian Power Compa-
nies Ltd., is a second example. Owner/operator 
of the national electricity transmission grid in 
Hungary, MVM continues to be almost 100% 
owned by the Hungarian state. According to 
MVM’s 2002 Annual Report (the last report 
available in 2004), MVM reported a total loss of 
30.784 billion Forint (approximately $112 million 
USD) for fiscal year 2002. Additional examples 
include the Budapest public transport system 
(BKV), the Hungarian railway (MÁV) and the 
Hungarian regional bus system (VOLÁN).  
86 I am indebted here to an observation from 
Kálmán Dezséri. See also the IMF’s individual 
country annual “Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes”, in particular the May 
2003 report on Hungary 
(http://www.imf.org,/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp). 
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can only be used for specific purposes 
and subject to parliamentary approval.87 
In the long term, there may be few 
alternatives to the eventual privatization 
of state holdings in large firms. How-
ever, future privatization and/or invest-
ment promotion strategies are subject to 
EU aid-intensity criteria which limit the 
latitude of CEE governments. Aid-intensity 
levels and restrictions on state aid for 
the rescue and restructuring of firms 
are strictly circumscribed by EU regula-
tions. On the other hand, the slow rate 
of privatization in some countries – in 
particular the Czech Republic – may ul-
timately have had a positive impact on 
overall rates of unemployment, thereby 
mitigating the more dramatic impact of 
the transition process. In Poland too, 
fears of the social impact of closing the 
state-owned steel sector kept the gov-
ernment from pursuing this path. In this 
regard, the share of the actively em-
ployed labour force in Hungary is 
somewhat lower than that for Poland or 
the Czech Republic.88 
In the long run, the above observa-
tions point to serious potential limitations 
to the EU policy framework. Structured 
at it is on the basis of states and inter-
governmental bargaining – in particular 
where overall EU expenditure levels are 
concerned – the EU policy-making 
framework poses real barriers to the 
redistribution of resources across states. 
As noted at the outset, even the new 
Constitutional Treaty preserves the right 
of individual states to veto policies re-
lated both to taxation policy and to EU 
spending (the EU’s multi-annual Frame-
work Perspectives). 
                                                 
87 Ibid. However, since most Hungarian firms 
have already been privatized, there have been 
few revenues from privatization since about 
1997. 
88 In 2002, the share of the actively employed 
labour force was 74%, while it was 87.8% in the 
Czech Republic and 85.8% in Poland. See the 
Economic Survey of Europe, (2004, No. 1: 193, 
Appendix Table B.5). I am indebted to an obser-
vation from Magdolna Sass. 
With the older and larger EU 
member states far more concerned about 
their own growth and employment, they 
are likely to favour policies that benefit 
domestic constituencies. Under such cir-
cumstances it is difficult to imagine 
strong support for a renewed redistribu-
tional agenda in the EU framework – at 
least one favouring the less developed 
economies of CEE. This is likely for at 
least two possible reasons. On the one 
hand, as net payers, the more advanced 
EU member states gain very little direct 
benefit from the EU’s SCF’s. And second, 
policies such as the Lisbon Agenda pro-
mote policy objectives from which the 
more advanced EU member states are 
likely to benefit. Thus these states are 
likely to focus attention on these agendas 
at the expense of alternative policy goals. 
As the EU grows larger and larger, 
this problem is likely to grow more se-
vere. Some 10-12 more states are likely 
to pursue EU membership in the not too 
distant future.89 Not the least among 
these, Turkey is scheduled to begin 
membership negotiations in October, 
2005 and is a large state that could 
certainly rival the voting power of cur-
rent large states. In this regard, the fu-
ture potential expansion of the EU is 
likely to result in an ever reduced em-
phasis on cross-border redistributional 
funding. Gaining support for funding in 
CEE has already proved complicated 
enough. The potential for extending such 
expenditures indefinitely to more and 
more states may ultimately drain the Old 
EU’s remaining tolerance for cross-border 
redistributional measures.90 At the same 
time however, this fact is unlikely to 
dampen the interest of the less developed 
                                                 
89 Croatia was also scheduled to begin member-
ship negotiations in March, 2005 and Turkey is 
scheduled to begin negotiations in October 2005. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and 
Albania may have a chance at future member-
ship. Additional states likely to remain EU 
“neighbours” include Russia, Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus. 
90 I am indebted here to a conversation with 
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. 
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economies in attempting to promote such 
policies and/or their alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
A number of important conclusions can 
be drawn that address multiple areas in 
the study of European integration, com-
parative politics and international political 
economy. For one, a first set of conclu-
sions relate to the theoretical literature 
on globalization and neo-liberal ap-
proaches to economic transition. Susan 
Strange (1992) once noted that globaliza-
tion drives states to compete over scarce 
resources – in particular capital. 
Whether open borders or the level of 
economic development drive states to 
compete in this way, one or both of 
these factors appears to have had a sig-
nificant impact on CEE strategies of in-
vestment promotion. States went to con-
siderable lengths to attract capital, even 
to the extent of fully subsidizing – how-
ever indirectly – the cost of large in-
vestments over time. Second, the neo-
liberal view that states simply need to 
open their borders to foreign capital in 
order to attract investment – while not 
rejected by the CEE experience – is not 
strongly supported by it either. As just 
noted, states went to considerable lengths 
to attract foreign capital to their territo-
ries. Even Hungary, which enjoyed a 
clear first-mover advantage91 in the re-
gion – presumably in part due to its 
early establishment of a stable legal 
framework for foreign investors – did 
not consider this sufficient and ultimately 
went much further. 
Third, many have suggested that 
the insertion of the CEEC’s into global 
production networks will provide the 
foundation for long-term sustainable eco-
                                                 
91 Sass (2004). 
nomic growth.92 However, this evolution 
appears problematic for CEE economies 
for at least two basic reasons. For one, 
as suggested above, extensive insertion 
into the global production networks of 
multinational firms may impede the po-
tential for sustainable, long-term eco-
nomic development. This outcome can be 
explained on the basis of three factors. 
A high degree of insertion into global 
production networks (i) may limit the 
relative autonomy of domestic affiliates in 
developing independent strategies to 
promote greater embeddedness, (ii) may 
have the undesirable impact of crowding 
out domestic potential for the creation of 
technology and innovative capacity, and 
(iii) may make firms and countries more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the interna-
tional marketplace and the strategic con-
siderations of multinational headquarters.  
For another, at least without more 
concerted efforts to refine and more 
deeply embed the existing structure of 
economic activity in CEE, these strategies 
may result in some crowding out of the 
innovation potential of the region. The 
more severe implication is that such 
strategies will lead to path dependence. 
This analysis thus places the emphasis 
for future policy considerations on 
strategies that will counteract the above 
mentioned concerns. These observations 
are not intended as a suggestion that 
countries should resist the privatization 
of industry or large inflows of foreign 
capital. The Hungarian case seems to 
suggest it would be a mistake for coun-
tries to avoid FDI as a solution to pro-
moting economic growth. This appears to 
be one but not the only important ele-
ment in promoting the potential for 
longer-term economic development. 
A second set of conclusions relates 
to the potential advantages of suprana-
tional vs. national-level decision-making. 
The supranational level of decision-
making may well prove inferior to the 
national-level. Countries marked by sig-
                                                 
92 See for example Eichengreen and Kohl (1998). 
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nificant differences in the level of eco-
nomic development may have significant 
difficulties coordinating compatible policy 
goals. At least for the CEEC’s, their rela-
tive room for manoeuvre has been con-
siderably reduced by the advent of EU 
membership. The EU accession process 
has been used to limit and constrain the 
behaviour of the CEEC’s in multiple 
ways. From restrictions on the use of tax 
holidays and state aids to restrictions on 
monopoly concessions, the EU accession 
process has gradually circumscribed and 
limited the range of competitiveness and 
investment promotion strategies available 
to the CEEC’s. 
Despite the common assumption 
that the supranational or EU level of de-
cision-making is somehow superior where 
the CEEC’s are concerned – presumably 
due to their Soviet legacy – it is too eas-
ily ignored or forgotten that at least 
some of the steps Hungary made in the 
direction of promoting greater economic 
competitiveness and investment were ini-
tiated even prior to the fall of the East 
Bloc.93 The investment promotion strate-
gies that emerged in later years built on 
the early experience of the mid to late 
80’s. Moreover, while many tend to as-
sume that the EU accession has improved 
the practice of economic management in 
CEE, in the Hungarian case at least, EU 
membership has offered a framework in 
which Western member states can better 
hope to control the fiscal and regulatory 
policies of the NMS’s. Moreover, the 
ability to do this presumably has a pro-
found impact on shifting the regional 
burden of economic integration and ad-
justment. 
A third conclusion relates to a 
commonly made assumption that the 
                                                 
93 Mihályi, for example, places the seeds of the 
Hungarian approach to transition in the early 
80’s and places the principal authorship of Hun-
garian strategies of industrial development with 
Hungarian thinkers. While two of the individuals 
he mentions are Hungarians living in the US and 
the UK, a good number of the individuals in-
volved had remained in Hungary (2001: 64-5). 
drive for EU membership explains the 
potential economic success of many 
CEEC’s. This paper suggests the opposite. 
In this case, EU membership is a con-
straining variable that limits the potential 
range of strategic choices rather than 
one of the principal factors explaining 
the relative degree of economic success. 
As Mihályi notes, Western experts 
strongly criticized the Hungarian strategy 
(2001: 64). In the context of develop-
mental models of the state, this paper 
provides strong support for state-led 
models of development and for the view 
that developmental approaches are likely 
to differ strongly across the more and 
less developed economies of Europe (and 
elsewhere). Moreover, this point has pro-
found implications for the shape of fu-
ture tensions in the EU decision-making 
process. 
A fourth conclusion relates to the 
debate over whether neo-functional or 
intergovernmental models are best suited 
to understanding what drives the process 
of European integration. From the above, 
interests appear to drive the behaviour 
of states in the context of European in-
tegration. EU member states have used 
the accession process not only as a 
means of constraining CEE practices, but 
also as a means of strengthening their 
grip on the EU’s redistributional re-
sources (Ellison, 2005). Thus, while the 
EU framework is one in which the 
CEEC’s may hope to have some influence 
on the decision-making process and legis-
lative output, it is likewise a framework 
in which the EU can more successfully 
control the behaviour of the CEEC’s. 
This does not mean that the CEEC’s 
will receive no benefits from EU mem-
bership. They should ultimately be among 
the principal recipients of structural and 
cohesion funding for at least the next 
decade and perhaps longer. At the same 
time, one should not ignore competing 
pressures for the continued re-
nationalization of EU spending vs. strong 
CEE interests in redistribution. And while 
the Lisbon Agenda’s focus on the knowl-
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edge economy may potentially benefit the 
CEEC’s – in particular countries like 
Hungary who are further along the path 
of economic restructuring – the CEEC’s 
generally have limited resources to dedi-
cate to such a program. Moreover, even 
in Hungary, several big projects still re-
main (such as the railways, infrastruc-
ture, the electric utilities and the envi-
ronment) that are likely to require sig-
nificant expenditures for years to come. 
Moreover, EU co-financing requirements, 
in the context of severe budgetary re-
strictions and the EMU represent very 
serious obstacles. Thus the compatibility 
of interests in the New Europe seems 
open to debate. The economic policy 
interests of New and Old Member States 
in particular are likely to diverge in im-
portant ways. In this regard, redistribu-
tional and resource struggles are des-
tined to remain strongly intertwined in 
future debates and policy-making strug-
gles in the New Europe.  
Two potential weaknesses of this 
paper are worth addressing. This paper 
may over-emphasize the actual role of 
the investment promotion schemes pur-
sued by different CEEC’s. The counterfac-
tual that such investment would not have 
flowed to CEE without these incentives is 
hard to disprove. However, the degree 
and shape of foreign investment might 
well have been very different. Though 
Hungary was early engaged in extensive 
privatization and allowed significant for-
eign investments, it still felt compelled 
even without regional inter-state tax 
competition at this early stage to offer 
significant promotional incentives to in-
vestors. Moreover, FDI did not flow in 
similar amounts to other countries of the 
region until they began introducing simi-
lar strategies. These two points remain 
difficult to explain without pointing to 
the importance of the role of government 
and strategies of the developmental state. 
The second failing of this paper is 
the fact that – by emphasizing the case 
of Hungary – it selects on the dependent 
variable. While some analysis of other 
countries is provided above, ultimately 
more work needs to be done on the re-
maining CEEC’s. As already suggested by 
the above analysis, there is a consider-
able amount of variation in the develop-
ment strategies different CEEC’s have 
pursued. The outcome of these strategies 
in terms of long-term sustainable eco-
nomic development and its distributional 
impact on citizens is likewise quite var-
ied. Some important elements of variation 
– such as Slovenia’s resistance to foreign 
capital or Estonia’s more neo-liberal ap-
proach – have not been discussed. Fur-
ther exploring the depths of these differ-
ences, their outcomes and the factors 
that explain them should ultimately pro-
vide a richer understanding of future 
CEE development prospects. 
* * * * * 
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